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Abstract—Network defense techniques based on traditional
tools, techniques, and procedures (TTP) fail to account for the
attacker’s inherent advantage present due to static nature of
network services and configurations. Moving Target Defense
(MTD), on the other hand, provides an intelligent counter-
measure by dynamically re-configuring the underlying systems,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of cyber attacks. In this survey,
we analyze the recent advancements made in the development of
MTD tools, techniques and procedures (TTP) and highlight how
these defenses can be made more effective with the use of artificial
intelligence techniques for decision making. We first define a
unified formal notation for MTDs that can capture different
aspects of such defenses. We then categorize these defenses into
different sub-classes depending on how they answer the three
questions– what to move, when to move and how to move–
showcasing how game theoretic strategies can effectively answer
the latter question. To understand the usefulness of these defense
methods, we study the implementation of such MTD techniques.
We find that (relatively) new networking technologies such as
Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) provide effective means for implementing
these dynamic defense methods. To encourage researchers and
industry experts in using such defenses, we highlight industry
use-cases and discuss the practicality and maturity of these
defenses. To aid readers who want to test or deploy MTD
techniques, we highlight existing MTD test-beds. Our survey then
performs both a qualitative and quantitative analysis to better
understand the effectiveness of these MTDs in terms of security
and performance. To that extent, we use well-defined metrics such
as risk analysis, performance costs for qualitative evaluation and
metrics based on Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA),
attack representation, QoS impact, targeted threat models and
defense cost for quantitative evaluation. Finally, we conclude by
summarizing research opportunities that our survey elucidates.
Index Terms—Cyber security, Network Security, Moving Tar-
get Defense, Artificial Intelligence, Cyber Deception, Game The-
ory, Attack Representation Methods (ARMs), Cyber Kill Chain
(CKC), Advanced Persistent Threats, Software-Defined Network-
ing (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Qualitative
Metrics, Quantitative Metrics, Risk Analysis, QoS Metrics
I. INTRODUCTION
The network and cloud infrastructure have become both
ubiquitous and more complex in the past few years. Gartner
predicts that by the year 2020, 60-70% of the entire IT
infrastructure which includes deployed applications, technolo-
gies and services will be cloud-based [1]. Other important
*The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication.
Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may
no longer be accessible.
trends that are expected in a cloud-based IT infrastructure
include serverless computing solutions, increased storage de-
mands, growing demand for cloud-based container solutions,
increased internet speeds with sub-millisecond service re-
quirements, more competitive Service Level Agreements, e.g.,
99.9999% promised up-time on certain cloud computing plat-
forms such as Amazon Web Service (AWS).
While the storage capacity, the networking efficiency, and
the hardware have received due attention and evolved with
business demands, the various aspects that govern the security
of a cloud infrastructure are still managed using traditional
means. Given that security breaches can lead to loss of
customer trust and worsen business reputation, a key question
is how effective are these traditional security approaches?,
i.e., whether, monitoring network traffic for malicious pat-
terns, patching known vulnerabilities (even if done regularly),
and relying on the network and perimeter defense such as
Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, Anti-virus, and Anti-
malware tools enough to detect and thwart attacks?
There are multiple inherent limitations of these traditional
defense mechanisms. First, the attacker, with time on their
side, can spend reconnaissance effort in modeling the cloud
system and then carefully plan their attacks. Second, imple-
mentations of these defenses in practice are often far from
ideal, thereby allowing attackers even more opportunities to
exploit the system. A report from 2016 predicts that by the
year 2020, 99% of the vulnerabilities exploited will be known
for the security and IT professionals since a year ago [2]. A
major reason for this is the time and complexity associated
with routine maintenance and security patching of the cloud
and networking infrastructure. A degradation in the Quality
of Service (QoS) provided to customers deters the Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) from making changes to the existing
configuration. Third, zero-day attacks developed using the
information the attacker gathers during the reconnaissance
phase render traditional defenses useless.
To address the shortcomings of existing defense methods,
Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a solution that
provides a proactive defense against adaptive adversaries. The
goal of MTD is to constantly shift between multiple configu-
rations in a cyber-system (such as changing the open network
ports, network configuration, software versions, etc.) in order
to increase the uncertainty for the attacker; in effect, diminish-
ing the advantage of reconnaissance that an attacker inherently
has against traditional defense mechanisms. Note that this is
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Fig. 1: We highlight a multitude of defense techniques based on the paradigm of Moving Target Defense (MTD) for cyber-
systems and showcase new research opportunities that emerge from the categorization in our survey. We first discuss how
all the MTDs surveyed can be viewed categorized based on the what, the when, and how that move. Then we showcase
implementation examples and options that can be leveraged to deploy these defense techniques in practice. Finally, we provide
a set of metrics that we believe are essential to properly evaluate the effectiveness of any MTD technique.
not true if the shifting mechanism is deterministic because the
attacker, with time on their side, will eventually understand
this movement and design their attacks accordingly, thereby
rendering the moving target defense ineffective. Thus, MTD
techniques should always have implicit randomness built into
them. Note that this randomness increases the cost for an
attacker to succeed in using a zero-day attacks because it does
not necessarily know which configuration of the system is in
place at any particular moment.
Advancements in networking technology provide a great
opportunity for system administrators to implement MTDs
in practice. Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [3] has
emerged as a technology to provide a virtualized implemen-
tation of hardware-based equipment such as firewall, routers,
etc. Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) can be realized through
Virtual Machines (VMs) or containers running on top of the
physical server of cloud computing infrastructure. Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) [4] acts as enabling technology
for NFV. The SDN controller can work as a centralized
security policy enforcer helping to design optimal movement
policies. The programmable interfaces afforded by SDN can be
leveraged to achieve a dynamic defensive strategy based MTD
[5]; thereby providing a systematic solution by selecting coun-
termeasures to prevent or mitigate attacks in an SDN enabled
data center networking environment [6], [7]. Furthermore, the
ease of implementing MTD mechanisms can help us evaluate
the effectiveness of these defenses in practical settings, beyond
theoretical analysis.
The key contribution of the survey are as follows: (1)
provides an umbrella under which we can categorize the array
of MTD techniques proposed for securing cloud environments,
(2) introduces a new language that can be used to describe (and
understand) new MTDs that makes clear what assumptions
were made and what aspects were considered in developing
the MTD, (3) gives an overview of how these ideas have been
or can be implemented in practice, and how these methods
can be evaluated from a qualitative and a quantitative stand-
point, in effect, shedding light on how effective these tools and
techniques really are, in terms of security and performance
(see Figure 1).
The rest of the survey is organized in the following manner.
In Sec. II, we introduce the reader to some background
knowledge about the various stages of an attack in cloud
systems, popular mechanisms for detection and defense of
malicious traffic, and frameworks for modeling known attacks
in cloud systems such as attack graphs, attack trees, and their
inherent scalability limitations. In the next section, we describe
a game formulation that captures the formalism proposed by
all the MTD works we look at and use it to investigate
and categorize the works depending on how they answer
the questions (1) what to move, (2) when to move and (3)
how to move them. Moreover, we highlight how the different
cyber surfaces - discussed under what to move– relate to the
various stages of an attack described in Section II. In section
Section IV, we discuss how the various MTD works have been
implemented in practice, with special emphasis on the role of
(and the effectiveness) of SDN/NFV in enabling them. We
then showcase examples of existing MTD testbeds that can
be used by researchers to evaluate their defenses and industry
adoption of MTD solutions in production-grade networks. We
categorize different implementation methods based on the kind
of technologies they use, and their level of maturity. In Sec.
V, we elaborate on various qualitative and quantitative metrics
that have been discussed in literature so far, and whether
they can help a cloud admin qualitatively decide if a defense
mechanism is secure enough. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss
the research directions that we believe are promising and need
investigation. We conclude the survey in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Moving Target Defense (MTD) techniques for the network
seek to move different parts of the network infrastructure that
an attacker may leverage to launch an attack. Furthermore,
many of the MTD mechanisms leverage some of the traditional
defense methods but add dynamics to it to make it harder for
an attacker to fool the overall defense. Thus, in this section,
we first discuss related surveys in the field of MTD that
try to provide a categorization for such defenses and then,
3Research Work Cyber Surface Shift Analysis Relation to APTs MTD Implementation MTD Evaluation Research DirectionsWhat When? How? Qualitative Quantitative
[8] 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 3
[9] 3 7 3 7 7 7 7 7
[10] 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 3
[11] 3 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
[12] 3 7 3 7 7 3 3 3
[13] 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 3
Our Survey 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TABLE I: A comparison of our survey with existing surveys on Moving Target Defenses (MTD). Note that our categorization
looks at all the super-set of aspects that others works consider. Furthermore, the analysis of MTDs in the presence of Advanced
Persistent Threats and a case study of how exisitng MTDs have been implemented are missing in all the previous works.
motivate the need for this survey. Second, we elaborate an
attack process that will help us later understand which step(s)
of the attack a particular MTD technique seeks to disarm.
Third, we highlight the traditional defense methods that are
presently used to detect or reduce the impact of an attack.
These serve as building blocks of MTDs, which we discuss in
the latter sections. Finally, we provide an overview of existing
databases (NVD, OVSDB, CVSS) [14], [15] that are used to
obtain domain knowledge about known vulnerabilities along
with their impacts, and popular attack representation methods
like attack graphs and attack trees.
A. Related Works and Need for this Survey
We present a comparison of our survey to existing surveys
in Table I. Firstly, we observed that most existing surveys [9],
[12] provide only partial coverage of topics relating to what,
when, and how to move the elements of the network. Section
III provides a more holistic view of various Moving Target
Defenses (MTDs). Moreover, the techniques surveyed do
not talk about modeling Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
scenarios [16], [17]. Our survey, on the other hand, provides
an overview of APT and its relation to the attack and defense
surfaces, thereby helping us to highlight how a particular
MTD may be effective against both known attacks as well
as unknown attacks.
We provide in-depth analysis of MTD and its adop-
tion using advanced networking technologies like SDN
and NFV. Moreover, we categorize the MTDs based on
where they lie in the spectrum of implementation– rang-
ing from simuation to research testbed implementations to
production grade industry products. Table V summarizes
various MTDs highlighting their use of centralized net-
working paradigms such as SDN/NFV (yes/no), and the
level of maturity at which they were was evaluated (an-
alytic/simulation/emulation/commercial). To the best of our
knowledge, this categorization has not been considered by
previous surveys.
Similar to our survey, many existing works [11], [12]
have taken a look at categorizing the evaluation metrics for
understanding the effectiveness of MTDs but unfortunately,
these works do not talk about the different components that
contribute to the evaluation of MTDs. In our analysis, we
consider both security and performance metrics associated
with each individual system configuration and with the ensem-
ble, enabling us to highlight directions that can help improve
existing MTDs.
Beyond just providing a categorization of existing work
that most other surveys seek to do, the goal of our survey
is also to establish a language for researchers to present their
new MTDs. This will help in making evident the aspects that
have been considered and those that have been assumed away
in the development of the particular MTD. Furthermore, our
categorization helps to identify promising directions for future
research such as policy conflict analysis post-MTD, prevention,
and hybrid surface shifting, modeling opportunities against
APTs, etc. (see Figure 15).
B. Attack Modeling Techniques
Knowledge relating to the phases of an attack executed
by an adversary in order to achieve a desired objective is
quite critical for the deployment of effective and intelligent
cyber-defense. Organizations utilize advanced infrastructure
management tools and follow best practices such as software
patching, hardening, log analysis for attack surface reduction.
Yet, skilled adversaries manage to compromise the network
assets by utilizing zero-day attacks, customized malware, etc.
that are often difficult to detect or prevent using intrusion
detection systems and anti-virus tools.
We believe that an intelligence-driven, threat focused ap-
proach for studying attacks from attacker’s perspective is
required for detection and mitigation of attacks, especially
against sophisticated attacks that are categorized as Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) [17], [16]. Lockheed Martin defines
the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) [18] for collection, correlation,
and categorization of the data related to a cyber attack. The
evidence-based knowledge derived from the study, can help us
in understanding, and thus, deploying an appropriate defense
mechanism against an adversary. Thus, we now describe the
different phases of the CKC against an APT scenario and
later, leverage this to see how MTD can be employed during
different phases to CKC.
1) Reconnaissance: The attacker gathers information about
the target in this phase. The attacker can perform passive mon-
itoring using automated tools such as trace-route and nmap to
perform network probes. These probes look like normal traffic
but are actually meant to identify valuable information such as
the Operating System (OS) or the service version of the target
machine, the network topology, the routing information, etc.
2) Weaponization: The attacker, based on information ob-
tained in the reconnaissance phase, utilizes tools and tech-
niques such as a phishing e-mail or a malware infected docu-
ment to create a targeted attack payload against the victim.
4Phase Network Defense Techniques
Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive
Reconnaissance Web An-
alytics
Weaponization NIDS NIPS
Delivery Vigilant
user
Proxy
filter
AV Queuing
Exploitation HIDS Patch DEP
Installation HIDS chroot AV
C2 NIDS ACL NIPS Tarpit DNS
redirect
Actions on Ob-
jectives
Audit
log
QoS Honeypot
TABLE II: Highlights how existing defense mechanisms are
related to the different phases of the Cyber Kill Chain.
3) Delivery: The transmission of infected payload takes
place during this stage. For example, the attacker may leave
malware-infected USB on the victim site or send an email to
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the company. This step
requires the attacker to evade the authentication and thus, the
people (and not the technology) become a more important
target during this phase. A trained workforce can help in
reducing the attack surface area.
4) Exploitation: The attack detonation takes place during
this stage. This phase involves the exploitation of vulnerability
and the attacker gaining elevated privileges on the victim’s
resources by utilizing specially crafted payload corresponding
to each known/unknown vulnerability.
5) Installation: Once the attacker gains elevated privileges
in the exploitation stage, they may install malware on the
victim’s machine or choose to harvest useful information in the
victim’s database. Tools that can analyze abnormal behavior
such as anti-malware, host-based IDS (HIDS) etc. become
quite important in attack detection during this stage.
6) Command and Control (C&C): Once the installation
is complete, the attacker contacts the C&C in order to
maintain remote control over the victim machine. Tools such
as network-based IDS (NIDS) and outbound firewall rules
are quite useful in detecting and blocking malicious outbound
connections requests.
7) Actions on Objectives: During this phase, the attacker
executes the actions to achieve the attack goals, such as
data-exfiltration, service disruption, etc. Two other important
behaviors often observed in this attack-step are pivoting that
involves identifying similar target nodes that have already been
exploited, and lateral movement that involves identifying new
systems that can be exploited in the network.
C. Defense Methods
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the various
defense techniques and highlight how each of these defense
mechanisms is effective in the various parts of a Cyber Kill
Chain (CKC) in Table II. This discussion will help the reader
better understand some of the MTD techniques that use these
traditional defenses as a building block.
1) Web Analytics: A huge amount of security-related infor-
mation is present on the web– in social engineering websites,
phishing sites, and dark-web forums– including discussion
about a particular target product or company. As discussed
by Glass et. al. [19], the problem of exploring and analyzing
the web for information should provide (1) Security relevant
information discovery capabilities (2) Situation awareness by
performing real-time inference over the available information,
and (3) predictive analysis to provide early warning for any
likely security attacks. One such data collection and analytic
system is CACTUS [20] that provides automated analytic
capabilities that can be leveraged by prediction frameworks.
2) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): There are two types
of IDS agents that can be deployed in the network under
attack, i.e., Network-based IDS (NIDS) and Host-based IDS
(HIDS). NIDS such as Bro [21] and Snort [22], use signature
match techniques based on known attack patterns and can
flag incoming network traffic as malicious or benign. HIDS
such as auditd [23] or tripwire [24], on the other hand check
the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) on the physical server
or VM, in order to identify malicious activity, e.g., privilege
escalation attempt by normal user.
3) Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS): A network security
threat prevention technology such as IPS [25] examines net-
work traffic flow to detect and prevent vulnerability exploits.
The exploits come in the form of malicious inputs to the target
application or service. The IPS is often deployed behind the
firewall and provides a complementary layer of analysis. Com-
pared to IDS, the IPS system takes automated action based on
traffic pattern match such as (1) dropping malicious traffic
packets, (2) blocking requests from a source, (3) resetting
connection, and (4) sending an alarm to the administrator.
4) Proxy Filtering: The proxy such as nginx can act as
an intermediary between the attacker located on the public
network and private network. A proxy can help in shielding
the real network from the attacker.
5) Access Control List (ACL): ACL can be applied at dif-
ferent enforcement points in a network. ACLs, such as netfilter
[26], investigate network traffic and based on properties such
as source/destination IP address, port number, protocol etc.
decide either to permit or deny it.
6) Data Execution Prevention (DEP): DEP is a security
feature that can be deployed in the form of hardware or
software to prevent malicious code from running on the host.
They monitor programs run on the host and ensure it uses
memory in an expected (or safe) manner.
7) Anti-Virus (AV): A software program designed to protect
the hosts from malicious programs such as a virus, spyware,
worms, rootkits, key-loggers, etc. The AVs can be classified
into two types– signature-based AV and behavior-based AV.
The signature-based AVs check the malicious program against
the database of known malicious programs. On the other
hand, the behavior-based AVs check the program behavior by
running it in a sandbox environment.
8) Tarpit: This defense technique involves purposeful in-
troduction of delay when responding to queries. The key idea
behind this defense mechanism is that adversaries will give up
on a target if it takes too long to achieve the defined goal.
9) QoS: The network traffic can be segmented on the
service type and importance. The segmented traffic can be
analyzed for bottlenecks and threats. The malicious traffic can
5be slowed down in order to increase the Cost of Attack (COA)
or selectively dropped.
10) DNS Redirect: The malicious connection requests can
be served a different response than was expected. The attacker
may seek to connect with command and control center using
a page with malware, but DNS redirect will kill this chance.
11) Honeypot: A security mechanism, which can be used to
detect, deceive or in some cases counter a malicious user trying
to gain access to key network services [27]. Honeypots such
as Cowrie [28] can help in better understanding the attacker’s
tools and tactics. The connection requests from the attacker
are directed to a decoy service, which mimics the behavior of
the normal service and logs the attacker’s activity.
Although there exists a large set of defense mechanisms,
attackers often use clever techniques to evade detection or
prevention. SANS [29] discusses methods like obfuscation,
fragmentation, encryption and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
against signature-based detection tools. Detection based on
HIDS can also be evaded by a skilled attacker using techniques
such as file location manipulation (using directories or files
white-listed by IDS), application hijacking, etc. Furthermore,
machine learning models that can help overcome some of
the shortcomings of signature-based detection tools can them-
selves be fooled by adversarial attacks [30], [31]. On similar
lines, deception techniques such as DNS redirect and Honey-
pot can help in deceiving the attacker temporarily, but over a
longer period of time, the attacker will eventually change their
attack methodologies thereby reducing the effectiveness of
these defenses. Stojanovski et. al. [32] performed experimental
analysis on how to bypass DEP protection on Windows XP
systems. Thus, there is a need to perform intelligent manipu-
lation to assure the attacker’s likelihood of reaching the desired
goal is limited, even if they can evade the traditional detection
methods. Additionally, the defense mechanisms discussed in
the Section II-C target known attacks with easy to detect
signature patterns. We discuss a special category of cyber
attacks known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), which
are harder to detect using reactive security mechanism like
IDS and Firewall in the next subsection.
D. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are different from nor-
mal cyber attacks. APTs are achieved by a group of advanced
attackers, that is well funded either campaign against a high-
value target organization [16]. An APT attacker i) pursues the
objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time ii) adapts
to defender’s effort used for resisting against attacks iii) deter-
mined to maintain a level of access required to achieve his/her
objectives. According to Mandiant Report [33], APTs such
as Operation Aurora, Shady Rat and Red October [34], [35]
have been used on a global scale for industrial espionage. The
attackers mounting APTs often work closely with government
organizations. The objectives are information ex-filtration or
undermining the key services in the network using multiple
attack vectors [36].
1) Attack Representation Methods: Cyber deception can
serve as one major technique to defend against advanced and
experienced adversaries. Shu et al. [37] proposed a cyber de-
ception solution to protect FTP services against APT attackers.
The research work is to ensure cyber deception consistency,
in which the attacker must remain believing their attack is
still successful. In other words, the defender may reroute the
attacker connects to another host (or honeypot for instance)
where the attacker is not able to notice a connection difference
between the real IP address, or the Honeypot trap. The FTP
services were hardened by observing the attacker’s attempt to
exploit vulnerabilities. Next, the attacker attempt is transferred
to a deceptive environment [37]. Bftpd and ProFTPd services
were set up in order to attract the APT attacker to the deceptive
area. The author calls the process of transforming the attacker
from the target to the deceptive area a context switch. It is vital
to ensure the exact communication setup remains during the
context switch process, otherwise, the attacker will know they
are being trapped. This process is achieved by tracking all of
the attacker traces before they enter the deceptive environment.
These traces include process ID (PID), the IP address, the raw
FTP command, argument of the command, the returned value
after command execution, and the output of the command.
The APT attacker’s knowledge is recorded and represented in
a logical tree structure [37]. The process of the context switch
involves the following steps:
• Attacker’s IP address and PID are obtained by the real
FTP server and transferred to a defense agent running on
the host machine.
• The defense agent dumps all the processes related to the
PID to an image file.
• An IP table rule is added immediately on the host
machine to prevent the actual FTP server from commu-
nicating with the attacker.
• An agent inside the VM handles the process from now on
by communicating with the attacker, also, another IP table
rule is added to prevent the VM from communicating
with the attacker with its real IP address. Otherwise, the
attacker will become suspicious of this activity.
• The VM changes it’s IP address to the host machine one,
which is also the one that the attacker is assuming they
are connecting to.
Changing the IP address of the VM to the host one will result
in different scenarios [37]. To handle this procedure, one pos-
sible option is to use the OS kernel to deliver packets coming
to either, a local area network, or outside network wherein the
first case the ARP protocol is used to deliver messages, and
in the latter case the packets are delivered according to the
routing table or to the default gateway. The proposed approach
was evaluated by setting up two experiments that involve
security experienced university students. The participants were
asked to attack the FTP server, and then determine if they were
able to figure out whether they were deceived or not. Also,
the latency and overhead of migrating the connection to the
VM are measured and evaluated, where it showed an increase
in the execution time due to creating many file systems and
directories inside the VM.
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Fig. 2: Attack representations such as an attack graph and an attack tree for a simple network attack scenario in a small-
size cloud system with known vulnerabilities. Creation of these representations from network vulnerability and reachability
information often suffers from scalability issues for real-world networks (see Table III).
E. APT and Cyber Kill Chain
Phases of APT can be mapped to different phased of
Cyber Kill Chain discussed in Section II-B. According to
Alshamrani et. al. [16], different phases of APT can be defined
as a) Reconnaissance b) Foothold Establishment c) Lateral
Movement d) Data Ex-filtration e) Post Ex-filtration.
The reconnaissance phase has been described in Sec-
tion II-B. The foothold establishment phase comprises of
Weaponization and Delivery phases from Cyber Kill Chain.
The attackers use the reconnaissance information in order to
prepare an attack plan. The information collected can be used
to exploit the vulnerabilities found in the target organization’s
web application, databases, and other software.
Once the attacker has gained a foothold into the target
environment, he/she can try to move laterally in the target
environment and gain access to other sensitive hosts and
critical information in the organizational network in the lateral
movement phase of APT.
In the data ex-filtration phase of APT, the attacker tries to
ex-filtrate the data collected to their command and control
(C&C) center. Most of the intrusion detection and prevention
systems do ingress filtering and not egress filtering, thus, data
ex-filtration often goes undetected.
The goal of the attacker in post ex-filtration phase is to
maintain persistence in the system for a long duration of time
until the funding for attack campaign is finished or the goals
of attacking organization/government are achieved.
F. Domain Information for Modeling Cyber-attacks
Defenders almost always have information about the system
they want to protect. This can help the model the system
and thereby the problem better for increasing the effective-
ness of MTD techniques. Such information may range from
knowledge of the network architecture, the capacity of the
individual machines, known vulnerabilities (and an idea of
how dangerous they are), etc. We now discuss a few popular
models and data sources that are leveraged by researchers, as
we will later see.
1) Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs): are
publicly known vulnerabilities and exposures that are cat-
egorized and can be referenced uniquely in the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) using a common vulnerability
enumeration identifier (CVE-ID). This system is maintained
and updated by the Mitre corporation on a regular basis to
make defenders and administrators aware of existing and new
vulnerabilities.
2) Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS): The use
of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) for
rating attacks is well studied in security [46]. For (most)
CVEs listed in the NVD database, we have a six-dimensional
CVSS v2 vector [15], which can be decomposed into multiple
components that represent Access Complexity (AC), i.e. how
difficult it is to exploit a vulnerability, and the impact on
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) gained by
exploiting a vulnerability. The values of AC are categorical
{EASY, MEDIUM, HIGH}, while CIA values are in the range
7Category Details Complexity
Automated Attack Analysis [38] Multi-prerequisite graph based on vulnerability and
reachability information
O(E+NlgN); N is attack graph nodes and E is graph
edges
Attack Cost Modeling [39] Time Efficient Cost Effective hardening of network
using Attack Graph
O(n
d
2 ); d represents the depth of the attack graph
Attack Cost Modeling [40] Model checking based attack graph generation using
Markov Decision Process (MDP)
Approximation algorithm ρ(n) = H(maxa∈A
{µG(a)}), where A is Attacks, µ is maximization
function.
Scalable Attack Graph [41] Scalable attack graph using logical dependencies. O(N2) − O(N3), where N is number of nodes in
attack graph.
Attack Graph based Risk Analy-
sis [42]
Scalable attack graph for risk assessment using di-
vide and conquer approach
O(r(n+ c)k), where r is small coefficient.
Attack Cost Modeling [43] Attack Graph cost reduction and security problem
solving framework Min. Cost SAT Solving.
NP-Hard problem, SAT solving methods employed.
Ranking Attack Graphs [44] Asset Ranking algorithm for ranking attack graphs
to identify attacks. Page Rank based algorithm
Similar to complexity of page rank algorithm.
Attack Cost Modeling [45] Identifying critical portions of attack graph. Min.
Cost SAT solving, Counter-example guided abstrac-
tion refinement (CEGAR)
NP-Hard problem, SAT solving methods used.
TABLE III: Complexity of the various Attack Representation methods.
[0, 10]. These scores are also known as the Exploitability Score
(ES) and the Impact Score (IS).
Although a defender may be aware of the known vulnerabil-
ities present in their system (by being aware of the published
CVEs that affect them), the knowledge of how they affect their
system, in particular, may help them in making better decisions
for security. The attack representation can be useful in order
to quantify the attack and defense surface for MTD. To this
extent, we define two heavily used representation methods that
can represent known attacks present in a system– the attack
tree and the attack graph as shown in the Figure 2.
The Figure 2, shows a network attack scenario, where an
attacker has access to FTP and SSH server over the network.
This example illustrates different methods for representing
multi-stage attacks, i.e., attack graph and attack tree which
we defined above. The FTP server consists of a vulnerability
which allows the attacker to obtain reverse shell (rsh) on
the system. SSH server on the other hand consists of buffer
overflow (sshd bof ) vulnerability. The goal of the attacker is
to obtain root privilege on the SSH server, i.e., root(2). The
attack progression using attack graph and attack tree has been
presented in Figure 2 (b), (c) respectively.
Attack Tree [47] as shown in Figure 2(c) is another method
of representing system security. The Attack Tree represents
the network attacks. Attack Tree represents a monotonic path
taken by an attacker starting from a leaf node to reach a
goal node. Attack Tree usually consists of set of AND nodes
(sshd(0,2), user(0) - Figure 2(c)) and OR nodes (rsh(1,2),
sshd bof (0,2)). The OR nodes represent one or more ways
in which a goal node can be reached, whereas AND nodes
represent different conditions that must be fulfilled in order
to achieve a goal node. Children of the node are refinements
of this goal, and the attacks that can no longer be refined are
represented by leaf nodes [48].
Definition 1. An Attack Tree [48] can be defined by three
tuples (N,→, Nr)
• N is all possible nodes in the tree;
• S+(N) is multi-set of all possible subsets of nodes N;
• →⊆ N × S+(N) denotes transition relation;
• NR represents the goal node of the attack tree.
Attack Graph is a data structure used to represent attack
propagation in a network with vulnerabilities as shown in
Figure 2(b). The start state of the attack graph represents the
current privileges of the attacker. The goal state of the attack
graph represents a state in which the intruder has successfully
achieved his attack goal, e.g., data-exfiltration, root privileges
on a web server, etc. Security analysts use attack graph for
attack detection, network defense, and forensics [49]. We
formally define the attack graph as follows:
Definition 2. Attack Graph (AG) An attack graph is repre-
sented as a graph G = {V,E}, where V is set of nodes and
E is set of edges of the graph G, where
1) V = NC ∪ ND ∪ NR, where NC denotes the set of
conjunctive or exploit nodes, ND is a set of disjunctive
nodes or result of an exploit, and NR is the set of a
starting nodes of an attack graph, i.e. root nodes.
2) E = Epre ∪ Epost are sets of directed edges, such that
e ∈ Epre ⊆ ND × NC , i.e., NC must be satisfied to
obtain ND. An edge e ∈ Epost ⊆ NC × ND means
that condition NC leads to the consequence ND. Epre
represents the attack graph pre-conditions (ftp(0,1) and
user(1) in the Figure 2(b)) necessary for vulnerability
exploitation and Epost are the post-conditions (rsh(1,2)
in the Figure 2(b)) obtained as a result of exploit.
The scalability issue of attack representation methods
(ARMs) is defined by the exponential rise in complexity and
size of the graph as the number of hosts or number of known
vulnerabilities grow in the network [50]. There are many
research works, which explain and provide some solutions the
help in overcoming the scalability issues in creating ARMs.
Amman et al. [51] presented a scalable solution in comparison
with prior modules [52] by assuming monotonicity. This
assumption allowed them to achieve scalability of O(N6)
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that various MTDs seek to move. Shifting of the exploration surface and the attack surface are effective only against some
phases on an APT, whereas shifting the detection and the prevention surface is effective throughout the APT life-cycle.
[53]. To mitigate the state explosion problem, most of the
existing solutions either tried to reduce the dependency among
vulnerabilities by using logical representation [54] or applying
a hierarchical strategy to reduce the computing and analysis
complexity of constructing and using ARMs by grouping
and dividing the connectivity of the system into hierarchical
architecture such as the work conducted by Hong et. al. [55].
The authors proposed a two-layer AG generation approach.
The goal of this work was to provide a low complexity
security analysis solution by considering network reachability
and vulnerability information at different layers. The two-
layered graphs they construct have vulnerability information
of the individual hosts in the lower graph while the topological
information of the network is in the upper layer. Authors
expect this approach to learning dynamic changes in the
environment. The research work, however, has no practical
implementation to support the theoretical model.
Table III highlights the complexity of creating various attack
graph and attack tree-based methods. As can be see, scalability
is a major concern when coming up with a good attack
representation, thereby impacting the effectiveness of MTD
techniques. In [56], the authors present a scalable solution for
approximating the attack graph of a large scale data-centric
network by using distributed attack graph computation fol-
lowed by semantic clustering. We discuss attack representation
methods as one of the Quantitative metrics which can be used
for measuring effectiveness of MTD in Section V.
III. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
The goal of Moving Target Defense (MTD) is to move
the components of a system in a continuous and randomized
fashion. This increases the uncertainty for the attacker, making
it harder (or costlier) for them to successfully exploit the
system. For example, the information gathered by the attacker
in the reconnaissance phase might become stale during the
attack phase if the defender has moved to a new configuration
in that time. Furthermore, we believe that MTD can be used as
a meta-defense technique that can be used in conjunction with
traditional defense methods to provide better security while
ensuring the minimum impact on performance.
Let us now discuss the formalism of Markov Games [81].
This is a generalization of the formalism defined for MTDs
in [63] and helps us capture the various aspects of the various
MTDs surveyed. An MTD system can be specified by the
tuple 〈S,AD, AA, T,RD, RA〉 where S denotes the state of
the MTD system (or a deployed configuration), A denotes
the set of actions or pure strategies the defender (AD) or the
attacker (AA) can take, T : S×A→ S represents a transition
function over he joint space of actions (i.e. A : AD × AA),
and R : T → R represents the reward/loss on performing a
transition (RD) or an attack (RA). We will use the superscripts
D and A to represent the functions for the defender and the
attacker respectively.
Note that most of the elements in the tuple such as S and
AD are highly problem-specific and can only be concretely
defined in the context of a particular moving target defense.
Although we do this later, we believe that an overview of
how the different defenses model the various elements of the
tuple help us to (1) get a holistic view of the various MTD
mechanisms, giving us a sense of what kind of modeling
makes a particular defense more effectively, and (2) highlight
opportunities on how modeling of a particular element can be
improved or combined with other MTDs.
Having defined the formalism that we will use throughout
the survey, we now describe our plan to categorize of the
various MTDs. We ask three questions that are relevant for
any moving target defense– (1) what to switch?, i.e. the kind
of surface that is being shifted by the MTD system, (2) when
to switch?, i.e. finding an event after which a defender should
shift, and (3) how to switch?, i.e. finding a mechanism that,
given the present state of the system, calculates a reasonable
action to take. We then show how answers to these questions
can help us in coming up with useful categorizations.
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Fig. 4: The different surfaces that can be moved by a particular Moving Target Defense (MTD). Moving the exploration surface
makes it harder for the attacker to figure out the exact system configuration by making the sensing actions noisy or untrue.
Moving the attack surface makes a particular attack inapplicable. Moving the detection surface, similar to ‘patrolling methods’,
helps in providing efficient detection in budget-constrained cyber environments. Moving the prevention surface makes it harder
for an attacker to ex-flitrate data even when they have a strong foot-hold insider the system.
A. What to Switch? ≈ What actions to play?
At a high level, every software system vulnerable to attacks
can be defined to have four surfaces. These are:
• Exploration Surface
• Attack Surface
• Detection Surface
• Prevention Surface
These surfaces interact with one another in complex ways,
especially in the context of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)
(see Fig. 3). A strong adversary first tries to explore the target
network, trying to figure out its topology, bandwidth, software
deployed on the different nodes, etc. The exploration surface
accounts for reconnaissance, verifying if it has actually gained
access and established a foothold and a new vantage point
to further explore the deployed system. All this knowledge
helps an adversary to execute attacks that can exploit the
system, helping them to move to different points in the
network, gather and ex-filtrate important information. As both
exploration and attack traffic tend to be malicious in nature
and thus, different from legitimate user traffic, the detection
and prevention surface can come into play at any point in time.
In Fig. 4, we show a Venn diagram that categorized existing
MTDs based on what surfaces they shift. Although there exists
overlap among the various research areas (especially when
viewed from the perspective of APTs), most MTDs shift one
surface at a time, hardly discussing what happens to the other
surfaces. After discussing the various MTDs, we highlight
some unexplored areas that can lead to development of new
defense methods which shift multiple surfaces.
1) Exploration Surface Shifting: The main motivation
behind shifting the exploration surface is to ensure that the
information an attacker can gather using by scanning for
open-ports, sending non-malicious traffic to uncover system
topology, discover vulnerabilities, etc. is noisy or inaccurate.
Thus, an adversary, with this faulty information from the
reconnaissance, will have to shoot arrows (attacks) in the blind.
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In [57], Al-Shaer et al. state that network attacks, by
leveraging reconnaissance, can help an attacker obtain the
IP address and port numbers. To take away this advantage,
the authors propose the concept of Random Host Mutation
(RHM). In RHM, moving target hosts are assigned random
virtual IP addresses (vIP) in an unpredictable and distributed
way. Formally, the action space AD of configurations is the
set of mappings from the set of vIP addresses in the Virtual
Address Range (VAR) to the set of hosts in the network. Each
action ∈ AD represents a particular one-to-one mapping in
a bipartite graph that consists a set of VARs and a set of
hosts. In [7], the authors seek to implement the same defense
method using a centralized approach that uses software-defined
networking (SDN) technologies like OpenFlow.
Another line of work tries to reduce the quality of informa-
tion an attacker can retrieve through exploration. In [58], the
authors use a centralized approach to obfuscate the network
links so that the topology that an attacker can retrieve via
crossfire attacks is noisy and unreliable. In this work, each
state is a possible path from the source to the destination
of the crossfire attack. Thus, the action space, i.e. the set of
defender configurations, AD is the set of all paths from a
source point to a destination point in the network under attack.
The MTD paradigm comes into play because the administrator
chooses one path, in a randomized fashion, so that the attacker
is not able to get a piece of reliable and deterministic path
information between the two points in the network. They are
thus forced to use a lot of attack traffic in order to retrieve a
good topology of the underlying network, thereby increasing
their chances of getting caught or having to deal with an
inaccurate (hopefully, not useful) topology. On similar lines,
there have been works that either try to move the fingerprint
of a protected host [59] or send back wrong information to
an attacker trying to query information about the hosts on the
network [60]. Although the latter work [60] looks to come up
with deterministic strategies for responses (and argue strongly
as to why they do it), the possibility of sending back different
replies opens up the possibility for an MTD solution for
shifting the exploration surface. These works are termed as
cyber-deception because the defender is trying to deceive the
adversary by feeding them false information about the system.
In such cases, the goal of the defender is to ensure that the
adversaries model of the underlying network is incorrect as
opposed to simply incomplete or noisy.
In [61], Jajodia et al. looks at how they can deploy honey-
nets in a strategic fashion. They show that deploying honey-
nets introduce deception in the network against noisy-rich
(NR) cyber-attackers (i.e. adversaries who try to exploit all
the vulnerabilities present in order to compromise the target
network). In this case, if we can represent the set of honey-
nets by H , then the action space AD of configuration consists
of all the subsets of honey-nets. Each state a ∈ AD, which is
a subset of H (a ⊂ H) that are currently deployed.
2) Attack Surface Shifting: Most of the work from the
research community, both in cyber-security and in artificial in-
telligence, has focused on this area. The main aim of switching
between attack surfaces is to render an attack action, that the
attacker chooses after some exportation, invalid (for example,
an attack to exploit a Linux-based OS will be useless if it is
run on a machine running a Windows OS. We first discuss
some MTD methods that are defined at an abstract level to
be applicable to various parts of a network environment and
then, focus on more specific ones.
In one of the earlier works [64], the authors have a set of
systems, which forms their space of MTD configurations, and
each configuration a ∈ AD can be represented by an attack
surface characterized by three properties– (1) the set of entry
and exit points into the system, (2) the set of channels and
(3) the set of untrusted items (data/system/network link) in
the particular state a. The aim of the defender is to switch
between the different states (or systems) so as to maximize
the shifting of the attack surface and at the same time, have
minimum impact on performance. This multi-objective trade-
off is a common theme in most of the other works as well.
In [65], Zhu and Bashar break down a full-stack system
into a number of layers (denoted by l). For each layer, they
have a set of technologies that can be used to provide the
functionality that the layer is responsible for. Now, when all
layers (or stacks) come together to form the full-stack system,
all possible combination of technologies cannot be used to
provide proper functionality to the end user. Thus, from all
these possible combinations, they handpick a few technologies
that meet the use-case demands for the full-stack software
among which they switch. Thus, this represents the defender’s
action space AD for their system. On similar lines, Sengupta
et al. [66] also assumes a full-stack web-application and thus,
similar action sets where the technologies relate to web-stack
development. The two papers differ in the way they decide
how to switch, which we shall discuss in detail later.
Carter et al., in [67], designs an MTD system that switches
between different Operating System (OS) (they call these
‘platforms’). Thus, in their case, the defender’s action set AD
is a set of all OSs that they can move between and a ∈ AD
is a single operating system. They also mention a notion of
similarity (or diversity) between two systems in AD on the
basis of code structure and logic. Authors in [68] move away
from MTD techniques that are abstract and expected to work
in general for all cyber systems. They implement an MTD
that can perform the OS rotation for machines deployed in
the underlying network using a centralized mechanism. We
now shift our attention to MTDs that move elements solely
relating to networks.
In [56], Chowdhary et al. describes an MTD that leverages
port hoping to thwart exploits of known attack on a cloud-
based system. In their work, the states of the system are
composed of variables, each of which indicates if a certain
vulnerability in the system has been exploited (or not) and
based on it, decides when and how to move. This fits well with
our discussion as to how attack surface shifting may happen
after the detection surface comes into play. Along similar lines,
authors in [69] move a deployed VM to a different physical
server if the impact of known vulnerabilities (measured using
particular metrics) on the physical server exceeds a threshold.
In [70], the authors implement MTD at a different level where
they move the services deployed on a particular VM to another
VM. A natural extension could be to use both the layers for
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designing a hybrid MTD that shifts both services between the
VMs and the VMs between the actual physical servers in the
cloud network resulting in a multi-layer MTD, as discussed
before [66], [65].
In [71], authors talk about a range of configurations (pre-
cisely 72 of them) and analyze the effect of using various
game-theoretic strategies for switching between them. They
shed some light on the amount of security gain that can be
achieved in various settings. In [72], the authors point out a
fundamental assumption that is often inherent in cybersecurity
in general and MTD systems in particular– the different
configurations of the MTD are not vulnerable to the same
attack (similar to the notion of diversity described in [67]).
They create a bipartite graph that maps hosts to vulnerabilities
and show that MTD is more effective when the diversity is
higher. This result is in lines with work in the security of Deep
Neural Networks (DNN) where higher differential immunity
to attacks leads to higher gains in robustness for ensembles
based on MTD [82].
In rare cases, the number of playable actions in AD
may become huge. Due to computation and implementation
challenges, a solution could be to first reduce AD to AˆD
such that |AˆD|  |AD| and then, implement an MTD with
AD = AˆD. In [73], researchers solve the first problem of
finding a diverse S′ using a genetic algorithm search methods.
On the other hand, authors in [74] showcase an MTD system
that moves between containers and highlight that migration
between containers, i.e., transition costs between the different
states hardly results in a performance drop. Unfortunately, they
are not able to generalize that such guarantees will hold for
all MTD methods.
3) Detection Surface Shifting: The concept of detecting
attacks from traffic on the wire or behavior or a request on
a host machine has been a cornerstone of cybersecurity. Un-
fortunately, placing all possible Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) on a system, especially in the case of large network
leads to a degradation in the performance of the system. Thus,
to minimize the impact of performance while keeping the
attacker guessing about whether their attack will be detected
or not, researchers have looked at intelligent ways in which
a limited number of detection systems can be placed in the
underlying network. These methods are similar to patrolling
methods that try to identify security violation in physical
security domains like airports, wildlife sanctuaries, etc. [83].
In [78] and [79], authors show that when faced with stealthy
botnets or external adversaries who are powerful enough to
attack any internal node of a deployed system, shifting the
detection surface helps to maintain system performance, while
being effective in detecting an ongoing attack. In both of these
cases, they have a set of nodes N that is deployed in the
network. The action set of the defender is composed of all
k-sized subsets of N , i.e., AD = {Nk : Nk ⊂ N ∩ |Nk| =
k(< |N |)}. In [80], the authors argue that in many real-world
multi-layered networks. The author’s assumption of an attacker
being able to attack from any point is too strong. Thus, they
use a Markov Game modeling and investigate the advantages
of relaxing it and reasoning about the MTD mechanism over
multiple stage attacks.
In contrast to the MTDs for detection surface shifting that
are motivated by performance constraints of the underlying
network, there is some work that investigates detection surface
shifting for the sole purpose of enhancing security. In [77],
the authors use an ensemble of classifiers that can distinguish
a mail as spam and switch between them to make it more
difficult for the attacker to fool the system. In their case, each
classifier is a possible action in AD.
4) Prevention Surface Shifting: The goal of an MTD
that shifts the Prevention Surface is to make the attacker’s
process costly by introducing uncertainty in their mind about
the defense mechanism in place. For example, it becomes
difficult for an adversary to realize whether (1) their attack
was undetected and thus, went through to the actual system, or
(2) was detected and is presently being monitored (in a honey-
net setting for example). Investigation on MTD techniques for
shifting the prevention surface has been scarce, especially in
the context of computer networks. We think this is mostly
because (1) an administrator can only use these defenses when
they are able to identify an attack with high accuracy and
(2) identification of attacks itself is a strong assumption. In
[75], the authors make this assumption and suggest an MTD
mechanism that modifies the bandwidth of the network in
response to malicious activity. Thus, the configuration space
AD consists of infinite actions as the bandwidth can take
any real value. Similarly, researchers have also considered
shifting the time window when replying to a query that may be
malicious [76]. They also consider the deployment of decoy
nodes and switching among them in order to hide from an
adversary seeking to actively uncover the prevention surface,
i.e. the decoy nodes.
5) Multi-Surface Shifting: MTD methods that move mul-
tiple surfaces of a underlying network can simply be done
by choosing one technology from each of the above sections
and combining them together. Yet, there is rarely any work
in constructing such hybrid MTDs, i.e. ones that model the
shifting of multiple surfaces at the same time. We discuss a
few works that try to shift both the exploration surface and
the attack surface of a system.
In [78], authors show that constructing a simple proxy-based
switching approach is an ineffective defense by introducing
a new attack known as the proxy harvesting attack, which
explores the surface to collect a set of IPs and then doing
a DDoS attack against all of them. To protect against such
attacks, they propose an MTD approach that replaces entire
proxies followed by the task of remapping the clients to these
new proxies. This renders the exploration effort of the attacker
useless and at the same time, reduced the attack efficiency
of the attacker. As opposed to looking at a particular attack-
motivated setting, authors in [63] formalize the concept of
MTD in which they highlight that shifting configuration can
include both the attack and the exploration surface but do not
go beyond syntactic notions to show how they can actually
be done in the case of a real-world system. In this regard,
authors in [62] try to strike a balance and formalize MTD as a
multi-step game and show some ways in which the exploration
surface ES can be shifted or expanded and the attack surface
AS can be shifted. Their configuration space, thus, represents
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Fig. 5: The time period between two move events is either a fixed interval or decided based on some form of reasoning in the
various Moving Target Defenses proposed in the literature.
the joint space of both the surfaces, i.e. S = ES ×AS.
An interesting future direction could be to leverage existing
security methods that add capabilities to multiple surfaces and
see how MTD can be used in conjunction with them. For
example, researchers have inspected the techniques involving
detection of attacks and countermeasure selection in a single
framework called NICE [87]. Can we leverage this to come
with MTD solutions that move both the detection and preven-
tion surface shifting remains an open question?
We believe the implementation of systems that integrate
multiple surface shifting mechanisms under a single MTD
mechanism has several challenges. For example, some of the
surfaces might render themselves easily to management by a
centralized controller like SDN, while others are better suited
for movement in a decentralized fashion. As to how these
can be combined together is probably not straightforward. We
believe that overcoming these challenges will be an interesting
research direction in the coming days.
B. When to switch? ≈ When to play?
Having defined the possible configurations that a defender
can switch between, the next question to ask is at what
point in time does a defender chooses to execute a switch
action that changes their present configuration s to another
configuration s′? The answer to this question is better given by
dividing the works on MTD systems into two broad categories
based on how the time window between multiple switch
operations is modified- Constant Period Switching (CPS) and
Variable Period Switching (VPS). We first describe the primary
characteristics of these categories and based on it, categorize
the different MTDs (see Figure 5).
In CPS, the MTD systems move from one state to another,
mostly in a randomized fashion, always after a constant time
period of T . This time is heavily dependent on what (surface)
is being moved. The bulk of the work in MTD systems reside
in this region. On the other hand, in VPS, the time period
between one switch can be completely different from the time
period of any other switch. We will later see that works in this
area can be further sub-divided into three different categories.
Although the two classes may seem to be the exact opposite
by definition, it is not hard to see that when we talk about
multiple surfaces being shifted, it is reasonable to have one
surface shift using CPS while the other is shifted via VPS.
We end the discussion on ‘when to switch with a discussion
of work in this region, which is sparse, opens up exciting
avenues for future work in Section VI.
1) Constant Period Switching (CPS): As mentioned, the
key idea of these methods is to move the configuration of
a system after a constant amount of time. In existing works,
this is generally phrased in one of the following ways- (1) The
actions of the defender are played after every time period T
(starting at zero) and at that instant, the system moves from
one state to another based on the state transition probabilities,
or (2) a new configuration is deployed by the defender a time
period T . However, independent of how it is phrased, they
mean the same thing, i.e. to move the surface at time T .
A lot of the research works in MTD literature such as [88],
[66], [79], [64], [61], do not explicitly bring up the topic of
a time period but inherently assume that the system moves
after time T . In these works, authors (1) model the problem
as a single step game and generalize the solution of this game
to multiple stages (not necessarily repeated games), and (2)
showcase the problem of when to switch as a different one than
how to switch and only address the latter, forcing the system
admin (or defender) to think of both when implementing MTD
solutions. Some works, such as [64], mention the challenge as
non-trivial (that comes up during implementation) but do not
provide a solution for it.
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Some research works explicitly state that the time period is
uniform and the equilibrium strategy is played at the start of
each stage [65], [67]. On similar lines, authors in [78] address
DDoS attacks use the term 1T to denote the frequency of
switching while research in [7] call T as the mutation interval.
Notations like ti in [77] allow a user to use different time
intervals for state i of an MTD system but default to a constant
time period in their work.
An interesting question is how long should this time period
T be in practice? In [68], the authors varied the time period T
from 60−300 seconds and evaluated based on the likelihood of
thwarting a successful exploit, the magnitude of impact for an
exploit, and availability of applications to evaluate a good time
for rotation operating systems in a network. They noticed that
a smaller T = 60s was often, good enough to thwart Network
Mapping (nmap) [89] attacks. Although, OS fingerprinting
was accurate in many situations even when t = 60s, an
attacker could not successfully launch an exploit because of
the small time window. For T = 300s, these results were
weaker when stacked up against automated attack systems but
showed promise when evaluated using manual attacks. In order
to allow for fast rotations, the authors set up machines with
different OS and after every interval, T redirected traffic to
a new OS. To reduce the load on having so many resources
available and reduce redundancy, we believe that having at
least two systems is necessary to allow for such small time
windows, especially when shifting between OSs– one VMs
sets up an environment while the other handles traffic and the
role switch in the next time step.
In [70], researchers use the knowledge obtained from his-
torical attack data to obtain a cyber attack inter-arrival (CAIA)
rate. Then, they create an optimization problem to maximize
the time period (denoted at Tm) of switching constrained upon
the fact that Tm is less than CAIA. On similar lines, authors
in [58] have looked at traceroute [90] data between possible
source-destination pairs in order to decide a reasonable time
period for obfuscating links or mutating routes of ICMP
packets on the network. This helps to mitigate crossfire attacks.
An interesting case arises in [57] because the states of
this MTD represent a bipartite mapping between hosts and
virtual IPs (vIP) and the authors let each edge in the mapping
have a separate mutation time. Each host has a mutation rate
associated with it (denoted as Ri in their paper) and some hosts
belong to a set of High-Frequency Mutation (HFM) set while
some cluster of hosts belongs to a Low-Frequency Mutation
(LFM) set. To ensure that availability of a host is not impacted,
the hosts that exhibit HFM map to two vIPs (one that it was
mapped to in the previous round and one to which it is mapped
in the present round) for a small time duration compared to
the time period of switching.
2) Variable Period Switching (VPS): The idea behind this
switching strategy, evident from its name, is to have a variable
time period for switching from a configuration to another in
an MTD environment. For example, if the system transitions
through a series of states denoted as 〈. . . , s, s′ . . . 〉 and the
time for which s (or s′) was up is denoted as t (or t′), then
t 6= t′. We believe that doing a VPS along with an MTD
mechanism is similar to doing a two-layer MTD where the
first layer deals with a meta MTD for shifting the time-surface
and then, the second layer MTD is responsible for executing
the actual cyber-surface switching. We do not categorize the
MTD works under the following sub-classes.
a) On-event Switching: Most works that have a variable
time period for switching fall under this category. The main
idea is that when a particular event occurs, such as detection of
an attack, unavailability of a link or a server, the time period is
altered and in most cases, a switch action is triggered imme-
diately. A well-known case study is of the FlipIt games [84].
The state of the system is represented using a boolean variable
that says who is in control of the software environment– 1/0
indicate that the defender/attacker has control of the server.
The defender gets to perform a move action that alters the
configuration of the server only when it is in control of the
server. Thus, the time period is dependent on how long an
attacker may be in control of the server.
In [59], authors update the belief about the sender type (are
they malicious?) upon detection of suspicious packets on the
network. This belief, in turn, influences the time period of
switching. On somewhat similar lines, authors in [72] have
a belief indicating whether a vulnerability is compromised
or not. Only beyond a certain threshold, the switch occurs.
Other works argue that obtaining belief parameters such as
with what probability is the sender an attacker? or With what
probability ss the system compromised? are hard to obtain
accurately in cybersecurity settings because they are bases on
direct detection of cyber-events. In [75], if the admin detects
a spike in bandwidth usage of a particular link or sub-net,
they change the maximum bandwidth value allocated to that
link or the network. Authors in [85] scan open connections
routinely and upon detection of unexpected connections, move
between MTD configurations to protect the system against
port-scanning attacks.
b) Strategic: In order to understand these methods, we
first define Tmax as the maximum time for which an MTD
system can stay in the same configuration. We can now divide
the time interval from 0 to Tmax into discrete time intervals
and then decide how to pick a T , such that 0 ≤ T ≤ Tmax,
at which a move occurs.
In [62], the authors incorporate the time period as a variable
in their state s. Thus, s′ = (s, T ) and the goal is to find
an optimal strategy to play in these new states. Thus, if the
optimal policy in state (s, 2) dictates the admin to not-switch,
the game moves to the state (s, 3) thereby ensuring that the
underlying cyber-surface does not shift. On the other hand, a
switch policy transitions the state form (s, 2) to (s′, 0) and the
original cyber surface from s to s′. Note that this idea can be
extended to other MTD methods that use state information to
decide on a movement strategy. On the other hand, authors in
[86] resort to a simple strategy and do not present analysis
as to how sub-optimal it is. They set Tmax = ∞ and based
on the impact of (known) vulnerabilities in the deployed
configuration and a threshold, select a T ∈ {0, . . . ,∞}. If
there are no vulnerabilities whose impact is greater than the
predefined threshold, then the system does not move and
remains static until a new vulnerability is discovered (either
by the defender or an attack).
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Fig. 6: Game-theoretic modeling for Moving Target Defenses (MTDs), that is necessary for obtaining optimal movement
strategies, can be categorized into either single-stage games or multi-stage games. This choice often reflects the type of threat
model being considered and the particular system for which the MTD is implemented.
c) Hybrid Switching: Although the idea of having both a
CPS and VPS in an MTD mechanism seems counter-intuitive
at first, authors in [76] looks at MTD mechanisms where one
layer that shifts the time window of replying to a strategic
adversary is done in an event-based fashion while the other
layer that deploys and moves among decoy nodes to hide from
an active adversary is done using a constant time period. This
opens up the possibility for works that shift more than one
cyber-surface to research into when it is better to select CPS,
VPS, or find a good combination of both.
C. How to switch? ≈ How to Play?
In this section, we seek to look at how the policy for
a defender who plans to move a particular cyber-surface is
decided. As stated before, a few surveys have been solely
devoted to analyzing how this question is answered. As all
MTD mechanisms can be viewed using the game-theoretic
formalism defined above, the survey on the use of game-
theoretic methods for network security [8] has some overlap
with our categorization. As we investigate a subclass of
the defense mechanisms, i.e. ones that are based on MTD,
we choose to classify our methods based on the following
categorization (shown in Figure 6).
1) Single-Stage Modeling: In this section, we investigate
how works have tried to infer the defender’s policy over the
action set AD by modeling the current state of the MTD
system and ignoring history or future considerations. In such
cases, the policy obtained for the defender is optimal (or an
equilibrium when formulated as a game) if the time horizon
for the system is one.
In [64], the state of the system can be modified by a pair of
actions, one by the defender and one by the attacker at each
game stage. The defender’s action, in this case, is a mapping
aD : F → {enabled, disabled, modified, unchanged}
where the set F represents the set of system features. Thus, by
applying these actions on a particular feature of the system, it
can shift the attack surface. The attacker has the exact opposite
action set AA and hence, they can re-enable a port, disable
a functionality etc. The rewards, RA and RD for the attacker
and the defender, are given by weighing the change is system’s
features ∆F , i.e. the change in the attack surface ∆AS and
the attack surface measurement ∆ASM , as follows.
RD(s, aD, aA) = B1(∆F ) +B2(∆AS)− C1(∆ASM)
RA(s, aD, aA) = B3(∆ASM)− C2(∆AS)
where the Bi-s and Cj-s are weights defined by security
experts of the system. Note that the cost of a defense action
(C1) and the cost of attack action (C2) are incorporated in the
reward. Thus, solving for an equilibrium of this game results
in strategies that account for the cost-reward trade-off. The
authors find a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in this game
and the equilibrium strategy yields the defender’s policy.
In [57] and [7], the defender assumes that more the ran-
domness and switching, less the success of the attacker. Thus,
they do not need to reason about multiple agents when coming
up with action from AD in state s. A state s is defined by
the present set of allocated vIPs to hosts. An action a ∈ AD
corresponds to selecting k unused vIPs. They either pick k
random vIPs from the free vIPs or use the top-k scanned vIPs
based on the assumption that vIPs that have been scanned more
have less chance of being scanned again. On these unused k
vIPs are selected, they randomly allocate the k present host to
them by using a random permutation.
In [56], [88], the authors explain the game modeling based
on a real-world example and compare the effectiveness of
reactive based switching and Uniform Random Strategy (URS)
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respectively. URS, which is found to be more effective, means
to pick any of the available action a ∈ AD with probability
—1/AD|. Other works that also use URS as the defender’s
policy are [68], [58]. In [68], given the present deployed OS
in state s, they consider the remaining OS configurations as
defender’s potential action in s and play a URS over them.
Similarly, authors in [58], given all networking paths from
source to destinations, select any one using URS. When no
information is available about the attacks and the defender
has no preference over the MTD configurations, playing the
URS seems a reasonable way to answer the question of how to
switch? Fortunately, more information is often available to the
administrator and in such cases, a URS may be sub-optimal.
To address this, in [67], [79], [91], [78], and [65], the
authors design a single-stage normal form game in which the
defender’s action set comprises of switching to any possible
MTD configuration and the rewards are defined over the
actions sets of both the defender and the attacker. Thus, if the
defender chooses to deploy a particular configuration c ∈ AD
and the attacker chooses a particular exploit e ∈ AA, then the
rewards for the players can be read from the normal form game
matrix. At equilibrium, a mixed strategy over the defender’s
actions turns out to be the optimal movement policy. Thus, the
defender rolls a dice at the end of each switching period and
depending on the result, chooses the next configuration. Note
that this is the optimal policy if the game were to be played
for just a single time period (time horizon is one).
In [65], the authors assume (1) a zero-sum reward structure,
and (2) an threat model in which the attacker is irrational.
Thus, the game is played multiple times and in each step, the
attacker’s play is observed in order to improve the characteri-
zation of the attacker’s behavior. In order to do so, the utilities
of the game are updated after every observation to reflect the
rationality of the attacker. After every update, the resulting
Nash equilibrium (NE) is played. In [67], the authors assume
that if the present system is working with an operating system
i and the system is made to switch to an operating system j,
lower the similarity between i and j, more secure is the move
action from i to j. The rewards for choosing action j ∈ AD
are defined accordingly and later fine-tuned by simulating the
behavior of an adversary. Similar to [65], the NE strategy is
chosen to be the defender’s policy.
The other works assume that the attacker can observe
(before any attack game-play actually beings) and realize the
mixed strategy of the defender using maximum likelihood
estimates. Thus, authors of [91], [79] concentrate on finding
the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy for the defender. The
rewards of this game, for both the A and D, are obtained using
the CVSS metrics of exploits that work in the context of the
defender’s actions, i.e. the MTD configurations that can be
deployed. On similar lines, authors in [78] use the notion of
SE to obtain defender’s strategy to thwart DDoS attacks.
2) Multi-Stage Modeling: Works in these sections reason
about (1) the history– paths that the system has taken, which
may be a result of the actions taken by the players, in order
to reach the present state, (2) the future– how the decision in
the present state affects the rewards in the future, or (3) both.
In [75], similar to the work by [64] in single-stage modeling,
the authors discretize the continuous action space of the
defender, which represent bandwidth values, to two levels–
high and low. Then they find a meaningful defender strategy
over them by ensuring that in a repeated game setting, the
advantage that an attacker gained by packet flooding attacks
(at some stage in the past) is neutralized by reducing their
bandwidth to the low state for 1 ≤ x < ∞ number of game
stages. On similar lines, authors in [77] consider a repeated
game setting and analyze the defender’s policy against self-
learning attackers. They infer that in their case, the optimal
policy converges to the URS. Other works like [59], also
update their belief about an attacker based on observations
drawn from multiple plays of the game. This belief is then
used to come up with an optimal strategy for the defender.
A set of works in MTD leverage the attack graph of an
underlying system to better reason about the sequential process
of an attack. In [94], the authors model the problem of network
intrusion via a Bayesian Attack Graph. The action set for the
attacker AA includes the probabilistic paths an attacker can
take in this graph. Then, the authors map these probabilistic
paths with defender’s imperfect sensing capabilities to form a
Partially Observable Markov decision Process (POMDP) [96].
Thus, the state and transition of this POMDP are designed to
model the attacker’s behavior and the optimal policy becomes
the defender’s strategy in a particular belief state. A shortcom-
ing of this work is that this strategy may be sub-optimal if the
attacker is (or chooses to) deviate away from the assumptions
that inform the POMDP modeling. On the other hand, using
a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) [97] seems
unreasonable in terms of scalability for any real-world system.
Authors in [93], [80], [98], and [62] relax the assumption
about partial observability and formalize MTD in a Markov
Game framework. In [93], authors consider policies over
the defender’s action set that comprise of either single or
multiple IP hops. Each action results in the defender uniformly
selecting the next state give that an attacker samples actions
randomly from AA. They are able to show that multi-element
IP hopping actions increases the defender’s reward by a greater
magnitude compared to static defense strategies. As we will
discuss later, the authors do not consider the defender’s cost
of performing a hop action or the downtime associated with it
as apart of the defender’s reward function. Thus, the optimal
defender policy might not be optimal for real-world multi-
layered network attack scenarios.
In contrast, the works [80] and [62] incorporates this trade-
off in the rewards RD and RA of the Markov Game, and can
thus, generate policies for the defender given each move of
the attacker at each step of the game. In [62], the inclusion of
time variable in the state and the trick of including the attack
strategies in the state to make solve it as an MDP makes it
hard for the solution to seamlessly scale on a large network.
In all these works, the impact on performance CD is a part of
RD and often, just a heuristic idea as opposed to simulation
in a real system that informs these values. The more accurate
these measures become, the better is the strategy. Authors in
[66] model both the performance and security concerns in the
different way that the above methods. The performance cost
is the cost of picking a particular switch while the rewards
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Middlebox Misconfiguration Overload Physical/Electric
Firewall 67.3% 16.3% 16.3%
Proxies 63.2% 15.7% 21.1%
IDS 54.5% 11.4% 34%
TABLE IV: Common causes of middlebox failures. Miscon-
figuration is a dominant cause of failure because of different
underlay and overlay network. This motivates the need of
unified configuration management framework like SDN.
of the state represent the security costs of picking a particular
configuration. Then, they formulate an optimization problem
that produces a defender strategy that reduces the cost of
switching over two steps (one switch) and maximizes the
security over a single step. Although it is known that there
may not exist a Markov stationary strategy that is the optimal
switching strategy in such cases [99], the authors in [66] do
not discuss how sub-optimal their switching strategies are.
Lastly, authors in [76] looks at an MTD defense mechanism
for deception (obfuscation of the links in order to send attacker
to decoy nodes) and model attackers who are actively trying to
uncover this deception over a repeated stage interaction. For
one problem, they use the Nash equilibrium (NE) while for the
other (identifying decoy nodes) they consider the Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE) as the defender’s strategy. We believe that
it is necessary to highlight a shortcoming of the different
modeling choices, especially in light of multi-stage attacks and
APT scenarios, however optimizing the model and ensuring
the scalability is a difficult task, thus we highlight these as
possible research opportunities in the Section VI.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF MOVING TARGET DEFENSES
In this section, we discuss how the various Moving Target
Defenses (MTDs) have been implemented using research
testbeds or industrial products. First, we briefly discuss the
tools for MTD implementation. In this regard, we highlight
that traditional networking technologies like middleboxes have
a set of disadvantages. To overcome this, users can leverage
the advancement in networking technologies such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtual-
ization (NFV). We briefly emphasize their role in making
MTD a pragmatic solution for real-world systems. Second,
we highlight how the existing MTDs discussed in the survey
have been evaluated in table V. We select a few of these
works and do a case-study about them to highlight how
movement strategies can be implemented in practice. Third,
the sub-section IV-D provides details of the test-beds used for
academic research and industry products.
A. Middleboxes for enabling Moving Target Defenses
Middleboxes are the devices used by network operators
to perform network functions along the packets datapath
from source to destination, e.g., Web Proxy, Firewall, IDS.
This provides a decentralized framework that can be using
alongside existing network technology to implement strategies
for MTDs. Furthermore, researchers have focused significant
effort on several issues associated with middleboxes, such as
easier to use, easier to manage and deploy, the design of
general-purpose middleboxes for different network functions
etc. This makes them seem like a good choice for enabling
the practical implementation of MTDs.
Unfortunately, a survey of various middlebox deployments
conducted by Sherry et al. [134] reveal factors such as
increased operating costs caused by misconfiguration and
overloads that affect their normal functioning. As shown in the
Table IV based on results of survey [134] of 57 enterprise net-
work administrators, from NANOG network operators group,
the misconfigured and overloaded middleboxes are the major
reasons of middlebox failure. About 9% of administrators
reported about six and ten hours per week dealing with
middlebox failures. Also, the adoption of new and secured
middlebox technologies is slow in the industry based on the
survey results. In the median case, enterprises update their
middleboxes every four years. The use of traditional networks
for incorporation of MTD defense can increase chances of
network misconfiguraion and outages.
Moreover, this static nature of the middleboxes themselves,
in contrast to the dynamic nature of the system they enable,
provides a assymetric advantage to the attackers as noted by
Zhuang et al. [63]. The attackers can perform necessary net-
work reconnaissance, identify the services and configuration
of the applications, and operating systems by leveraging the
middleboxes. This information helps the attacker in choosing
best-fit attack methods against the static configuration and
select the best time to attack the system. The attackers can
use the compromised resource to maintain the foothold in the
network for a long period of time and try to exploit other
high-value targets in the same network.
B. SDN and NFV for enabling Moving Target Defenses
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [4] is defined as a
networking paradigm that decouples the control plane from
the data plane, allowing a global view of the network, and
centralized control capabilities. SDN deals with packet head-
ers, from layers 2-4 of OSI model and other protocols such
as MPLS [135]. SDN and NFV have emerged as a state-
of-the-art network architecture for data centers and backbone
networks. Google’s B4 project [136] shows the feasibility of
SDN for handling real-world network challenges such as traffic
engineering and Quality of Service (QoS).
The decoupling allows a a network architecture where
switches act as forwarding devices, maintaining flow tables
populated with flow rules. The new architecture allows con-
siderably more flexible and effective network management
solutions, and a unified programmable interface that can be uti-
lized by software developers for application deployment [137].
The SDN architecture can be vertically split into three layers
described below:
• Application Plane: It consists of end-user business appli-
cations that consume SDN communication and network
services. The examples include network security or vir-
tualization applications.
• Control Plane: The control plane consists of SDN
controllers such as ONOS [101], OpenDaylight [106]
providing open Application program interfaces (APIs) to
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Research
Work
SDN/NFV Implementation Layer Technologies/ Testbed Maturity Level
[80], 2019 X network and application Sample Use-Case simulation
[100], 2018 X network and application ONOS [101] emulation
[60], 2018 network Personalized use cases simulation
[61], 2018 abstract Personalized use cases simulation
[92], 2018 X network and application Personalized use-cases simulation
[88], 2018 X network Personalized test-bed with VMs emulation
[102], 2018 application Polyverse commercial
[37], 2018 network and application Personalized Test-bed with VMs simulation
[95], 2018 network personalized use-cases simulation
[103], 2018 network and application Deception Grid [103], Crypto Trap [104] commercial
[79], 2018 network and application Mininet both
[105], 2017 X network Opendaylight Helium [106] simulation
[107], 2017 X network Ryu SDN [108] simulation
[109], 2017 application LLVM compiler [110] emulation
[66], 2017 application personalized use-cases simulation
[111], 2017 application CMS application [112] simulation
[113], 2017 application Simpy [114] simulation
[75], 2017 X network network simulator + ODL controller emulation
[62], 2017 abstract Personalized Test-bed with VMs simulation
[59], 2017 X application Mininet with POX controller emulation
[85], 2017 X network CloudLab [115] emulation
[66], 2017 application personalized test-bed simulation
[116], 2017 network and application Morphisec commercial
[58], 2016 X network Mininet with Floodlight controller emulation
[93], 2016 network Personalized use-cases simulation
[56], 2016 X abstract OpenStack [117] with ODL [106] controller emulation
[118], 2016 network OpenStack [117] emulation
[70], 2016 X network GENI [119] emulation
[78], 2016 network Rocketfuel Dataset simulation
[120], 2016 network ARCSYNE [121] & SDNA [122], [123] emulation
[86], 2016 X network and application Mininet with POX controller simulation
[124], 2016 X network CyberVAN commercial
[70], 2016 X application GENI [119] emulation
[71], 2015 abstract Personalized simulation environment simulation
[125], 2015 network and application Cyber Quantification Framework emulation
[76], 2015 network matlab simulation
[94], 2015 network personalized use-cases simulation
[126], 2015 network and application RPAH framework simulation
[68], 2014 network and application CORE Impact Pro commercial
[67], 2014 application personalized test-bed simulation
[127], 2014 X network Personalized Cloud System emulation
[128], 2013 network and application PlanetLab [129] emulation
[87], 2013 network and application Personalized virtual cloud system emulation
[84], 2013 abstract Personalized test-bed simulation
[65], 2013 application game-based theoretical framework analytic
[7], 2012 X network NOX in Mininet emulation
[72] , 2012 abstract Proposes to use a modified CTF environment analytic
[73] , 2012 network and application Personalized test-bed emulation
[77], 2012 network KDD dataset [130] simulation
[57], 2012 X network Personalized use cases simulation
[131], 2011 network and application SLAAC [132] simulation
[133], 2011 network MUTE simulation
TABLE V: A taxonomy of MTD Implementation– classifies based on use of SDN/NFV, the layer of network protocol stack
they target, key technologies used, and the level of maturity at which these MTDs were implemented.
monitor network forwarding behavior. The communica-
tion interface between the application and control plane
is known as northbound interface. The interface between
control and data plane is known as southbound interface.
• Data Plane: The forwarding elements such as OpenFlow
switches are present in the data plane. The forwarding
devices can be physical or virtual switches. Control plane
installs flow rules in order to govern the forwarding
behavior of data plane devices.
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [3] has emerged
as a technology to provide a virtualized implementation of
hardware-based equipment such as firewall, routers, Intrusion
Detection System (IDS). Virtual Network Functions (VNFs)
can be realized through virtual machines (VMs) or containers
running on top of the physical server of cloud computing
infrastructure. SDN acts as enabling technology for NFV. De-
spite the great benefits offered by SDN and NFV, the security,
privacy, and trust management [138] has been addressed only
by few research works (see Fig. V).
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C. SDN-based MTD Applications and Case Study
We categorize the MTD industrial, and research implemen-
tations from the perspective of networking technologies used,
e.g., traditional network or SDN/NFV as shown in the Table V,
as highlighted in column 2. It is noteworthy that SDN/NFV
has been a dominant technology for MTD research. Around
34% of the research works in Table V, utilize SDN/NFV for
implementation of MTD or cyber-deception. Column 3 de-
scribes the layer in network protocol stack where the describe
MTD solution has been implemented. Most research works
have been implemented at network, and pplication layers.
We also identify the key technologies used by these research
works in the column 4 of the table. If a certain research
work utilizes and implementation testbed, e.g., GENI [119],
the name of the testbed has been mentioned in this column.
Column 5 of the table shows the level of maturity of the MTD
research work. We categorized the research works into four
levels - analytic - if only numerical results or thought-based
experiments have been presented in the said paper. We put the
research work under the category simulation - if the research
work describes some simulated network, e.g., Mininet. The
emulation category consists research works that use close to
real world networks, e.g. multiple VMs deployed in a cloud
testbed, e.g., GENI [119]. Lastly, if the research work has been
deployed in some commercial product dealing with live attacks
in a production grade network, we consider these research
works under category commercial.
We observed that more than 50% of the research works
use simulated networks or applications when experimenting
with MTD techniques, whereas ∼ 34% of research works
have used emulated environments for performing MTD based
analysis research. Only few MTD solutions e.g., ∼ 13% have
implemented MTD at commercial level (in production grade
networks for dealing with live attacks). This shows that though
MTD has been well accepted in research community, and
benefits of MTD can help in dealing with different threat
models, the industry adoption of MTD is rather slow. The key
reason behind this is the adverse impact that MTD can induce
on Quality of Service(QoS), and the additional cost-overhead
associated with deployment of MTD. We discuss these factors
under Qualitative and Quantitative metrics in Section V.
1) SDN-based Network Mapping and Reconnaissance Pro-
tection: The first step of the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) is
the identification of vulnerable software and OS versions.
Most scanning tools make use of ICMP, TCP or UDP scans
to identify the connectivity and reachability of the potential
targets. The replies to the scans can also reveal the firewall
configuration details, i.e., what traffic is allowed or denied.
The time to live (TTL) information can also help in the
identification of a number of hops to the attack target [127].
SDN-enabled devices can help in delaying the network at-
tack propagation by hiding the real response and replying back
with a random response in order to confuse the attacker. As a
result, the attacker will believe that random ports are open in
the target environment. The attack cost will be increased since
the attacker will need to distinguish the real reply from the fake
reply. SDN-enabled devices can also introduce random delays
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Fig. 7: OpenFlow-based Random Host Mutation. The solution
mutates virtual IP (vIP) of hosts based on pool of available IP
addresses (treatment of MTD as an adaptation problem).
in TCP handshake request that will disrupt the reconnaissance
process utilized by the attacker for identification of TCP
services. The cost-benefit analysis of MTD adaptations against
network mapping attempts has been discussed by Kampankis
et al. [127]. The survey considers cost-benefit aspects of MTD
in Section V, under the quantitative metrics of MTD.
2) Service Version and OS Hiding:: The attacker needs to
identify the version of OS or vulnerable service in order to
mount an attack. For instance, the attacker can send HTTP
GET request to Apache Web Server, and the response can help
in identification of vulnerability associated with a particular
version of the Apache software. If the attacker gets a reply
404 Not Found, he can identify some obfuscation happening
at the target software. A careful attacker can thus change the
attack vector to exploit the vulnerability at the target.
An SDN-enabled solution can override the actual service
version with a bogus version of the web server. Some ap-
plication proxies leverage this technique to prevent service
discovery attempts by a scanning tool. Another attack method
is known as Operating System (OS) Fingerprinting, where
the attacker tries to discover the version of the OS which
is vulnerable. Although modern OS can generate a random
response to TCP and UDP requests, the way in which TCP
sequence numbers are generated can help an attacker in the
identification of OS version.
In an SDN-enabled solution, the OS version can be obfus-
cated by the generation of a random response to the probes
from a scanning tool. SDN can introduce a layer of true
randomization for the transit traffic to the target. The SDN
controller can manage a list of OS profiles and send a reply
resembling TCP sequence of a bogus OS, thus misguiding the
attacker.
3) Protection against multi-stage attacks and service dis-
ruption:: Once the attackers have obtained necessary infor-
mation, they proceed towards targeted attacks, with the aim
of stealing information - SQL Injection or service disruption -
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The SDN-based MTD
can introduce various countermeasures at network-level such
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Fig. 8: SDN/NFV based MTD that models the interaction as a
game between attacker and defender in order to select an op-
timal countermeasure strategy. The work considers bandwidth
limitation, and treats the MTD as an adaptation problem.
as network shuffling [105], route modification [100], IP, and
port obfuscation as discussed by Wang et al. [85].
We now discuss some case studies which show use of
SDN/NFV capabilities for implementation of MTD techniques
- what, when, and how to switch? Jafarian et al. [7] use
OpenFlow based random host mutation technique to switch
virtual IP (what to switch) targeted by reconnaisance attempts.
Debroy et al. [70] use SDN framework to identify optimal
rate of migration (when to switch) and ideal migration lo-
cation for VMs under DoS attack. Chowdhary et al. [75]
use SDN-environment to create a analyze the hosts mounting
DDoS attacks on critical network services. The SDN-controller
downgrades network bandwidth (how to switch) using a Nash-
Folk theorem based punishment mechanism.
 Case Study (What to Switch)– OpenFlow Random
Host Mutation. SDN makes use of OpenFlow protocol for
control plane traffic. Jafarian et al. [7] proposed OpenFlow
enabled MTD architecture as shown in Figure 7, can be used
to mutate IP address with a high degree of unpredictability
while keeping a stable network configuration and minimal
operational overhead.
The mutated IP address is transparent to the end host. The
actual IP address of the host called real IP (rIP), which is
kept unchanged, but it is linked with a short-lived virtual IP
address (vIP) at regular interval. The vIP is translated before
the host. The translation of rIP-vIP happens at the gateway
of the network, and a centralized SDN controller performs
the mutation across the network. A Constraint Satisfaction
Problem (CSP) is formulated in order to maintain mutation
rate and unpredictability constraints. The CSP is solved using
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver.
Sensitive hosts have a higher mutation rate compared to the
regular hosts in this scheme. The OF-RHM is implemented
using Mininet network simulator and NOX SDN controller.
OF-RHM is able to thwart about 99% of information gathering
and external scanning attempts. The framework is also highly
effective against worms and zero-day exploits.
 Case Study (How to Switch)– Dynamic Game-based
Security in SDN-enabled Cloud Networks. DDoS attacks are
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Fig. 9: Virtual Machine (VM) migration using frequency
minimal MTD that is effective against DoSS attacks. The
goal of this work was to find an optimal migration frequency,
thereby answering the question when to move.
a major security threat affecting networks. Attacker’s leverage
sophisticated bots to generate a huge volume of network
traffic, and overwhelm critical network services as discussed
by Chowdhary et al. [75]. The case study presented in this
research work, focused on the MTD decision how to move?
The framework presented in Figure 8 (a) to communicate with
OpenFlow devices using southbound REST API, whereas any
application plane decision and network analytic is performed
using northbound REST API.
The Snort IDS [139] detects malicious DDoS patterns, and
uses Nash Flok Theorem [140] to analyze the behavior of a
malicious node, e.g., red color VM shown in Figure 8 (a).
The information is represented as an extensive-form game of
multiple rounds. If the node sending network traffic P2, the
Defect - Figure 8 (b), the normal bandwidth B is reduced to
B
2 . The bandwidth is reduced in each subsequent round by
network admin P1, till average bandwidth over a period of
time t = {0, 1, 2, ..} ∈ T is B.
The SDN controller utilizes Instruction field present inside
the flow table in order to change the band rate of the
node flagged as malicious, as shown in Figure 8 (c). Thus
SDN-based rate-limiting serves as an effective countermeasure
against flooding/loss of availability attacks like DDoS. Case Study (When to Switch): Frequency Minimal
MTD using SDN. Frequency minimal MTD [70] approach
considers resource availability, QoS and exploits probability
for performing MTD in an SDN-enabled cloud infrastructure.
The design goals of this research work are as follows:
1) Identification of optimal frequency of VM migration,
ensuring minimal wastage of cloud resources.
2) Finding the preferred location of VM migration without
impacting the application performance.
As shown in Figure 9, the normal clients can access the
services hosted in the cloud network via regular path, and the
attack path represents the path along which the attacker tries
to exploit the target application.
The VMs periodically share their resource information such
as storage and compute capacity with the controller along the
control path. Depending upon the level of threat, the migration
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of VM can be proactive or reactive. The real IP address of the
VM hosting cloud application is hidden from the clients. The
data-path shows the path along which VM application and its
back-end database are migrated. VM migration is based on
the following factors:
• VM Capacity: This parameter considers the capacity
of migration target in terms of computing resources
available to store files and database of current and future
clients.
• Network Bandwidth: The lower the network bandwidth
between the source and target VM, the slower will be the
migration process and the longer will be the exposure
period (in case of active attacks) for the VM being
migrated. This parameter considers bandwidth between
source and target while performing VM migration.
• VM Reputation: This is the objective indicator of VM
robustness to deter future cyber attacks. It is the history
of VM in terms of cyber attacks launched against the
VM. This parameter is considered in order to ensure VMs
suitability for migration.
This research work estimates the optimal migration fre-
quency and ideal migration location based on the parameters
described above. The VM migration mechanism is highly
effective in dealing with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
D. MTD Testbeds: Research and Prototyping
The practicality of MTD can be established by the de-
ployment of MTD techniques and tactics over an underlying
network. In this section, we identify some platforms which can
assist MTD researchers in conducting experiments or serve as
a guideline when creating MTD case studies.
1) GENI Platform: Global Environment for Networking
Innovation (GENI) [119] provides a distributed virtual en-
vironment for at-scale networking and security experimen-
tation. Individual experiments can be conducted in isolation
using network sliceability (ability to support virtualization
and network isolation). Each experimental slice is provided
with network and computing resources. The users can request
resources for an allotted time period, in which they can
conduct experiments and release the resources once they have
finished the experiment.
Debroy et al. [70] utilized GENI framework for implemen-
tation of a VM migration MTD solution. The authors utilized
the InstaGENI platform at the Illinois site to host a news feed
application targeted by DoS attacks. The setup also involved
four non-malicious users, one remote SDN controller, and
attacking VMs, all hosted at physically distributed locations.
The attacker VMs were utilized for sending a large number
of HTTP GET requests to news feed site in order to achieve
a DoS attack. Proactive and reactive frequency minimal (FM)
MTD countermeasures were deployed in response to targeted
DoS attacks.
The research work shows the capability of GENI platform to
host similar MTD experiments where users can study the im-
pact on network bandwidth, VM performance, attack success
rate when MTD security countermeasures are implemented at
scale on a cloud platform.
MTD System 
Cloud Infrastructure (OpenStack)
Processing 
Module
Configuration and Provisioning Module
Operations Model (proposed abstraction)
CMT Puppet Openstack API Library
MTD System Specification 
(initial deployment)
MTD
Controller
Fig. 10: A platform that takes an abstract specification of a
cloud system as input and outputs the corresponding system on
a cloud infrastructure. Advantages of cloud automation using
Automated eNterprise net-work COmpileR (ANCOR), which
also includes performing live instance migration.
2) OpenStack Cloud: OpenStack [117] is a cloud operating
system that consists of compute, storage, and networking
resources. The users can log in through GUI to provision
isolated virtual networks or utilize OpenStack APIs to create
and configure the network. OpenStack is compatible with the
existing virtual solutions such as VMWare ESX, Microsoft’s
Hyper-V, KVM, LXC, QEMU, UML, Xen, and XenServer.
Mayflies [118] utilized OpenStack for designing a fault-
tolerant MTD system. The research work utilizes VM intro-
spection to checkpoint the current state of the live node/VM,
and reincarnation - node commission/decommission based on
attacks against the introspected node. The strategy allows the
Mayflies framework to deal with attacks in a short interval
of time, avoiding the attack progress. Zhuang et al. [141]
conducted MTD experiments to simulate a pure-random MTD
strategy and an intelligent MTD approach based on intelli-
gent attack indicators. The experiments were conducted using
NeSSi2 [142], an open-source, discrete event-based network
security simulator. The authors proposed implementation on
an OpenStack based MTD testbed as future work.
MTD CBITS MTD-platform for Cloud-Based IT Systems
(MTD CBITS) [143] as shown in Figure 10 evaluates the
practicality and performs detailed analysis of security benefits
when performing MTD on a cloud system such as OpenStack.
The platform makes automated changes to the IT systems
running on the cloud infrastructure. One adaptation performed
in MTD CBITS is replacing the running components of the
system with new ones. The system parameters are stored in the
operational model and can be viewed using the MTD system
inventory - CMT (Puppet) APIs. Any MTD adaptation is also
recorded in an operational model for future reference. Open-
Stack API utilizes Puppet agents to communicate with the live
instances of the cloud system. MTD controller communicates
with agents over a private network.
3) CyberVAN Testbed: [124] provides a testing and exper-
imentation platform for cybersecurity research. The platform
supports high fidelity network, by representing the network in
a discrete event simulator. CyberVAN allows hosts represented
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by VMs to communicate over the simulated network. The
testbed utilizes network simulator ns-3 [144] to simulate net-
work effects such as end-to-end network latency, link capac-
ities, routing protocols, etc. The platform also supports wire-
less networks by modeling mobility, interference, propagation
effects, as well as the details of different waveforms. The
Scenario Management GUI allows the experimenter to access
and manage the elements of an attack scenario, including
network traffic and logging, running analytic tools on the VM,
saving results of the experiment, pausing and restarting the
experiments, etc.
4) MTD Commercial Domain Solutions: TrapX: The
production-grade decoy network technologies such as Decep-
tionGrid [103] and CryptoTrap [104] deceive the attackers
by imitating the true assets. DeceptionGrid provides agentless
visibility and control appliance, that dynamically identifies
and evaluates network endpoints and applications when they
connect to the main network. Assuta Medical Center incor-
porated DeceptionGrid as a part of their network security
suite. The use of this framework help in countering not only
known attacks but also APTs and zero-day attack scenarios.
The DeceptionGrid created a network of traps (decoys) that
camouflaged real medical devices such as MRI & CT scan-
ners, X-ray machines, and ultrasound equipment (PACs). The
solution has been deployed on many VLANs across Assuta
Medical Center and provided better visibility into the lateral
movement of the attackers.
CryptoTrap on the other hand is utilized for countering the
ransomware early in their exploitation lifecycle. This helps
in countering malware propagation while protecting valuable
network assets. The traps (decoys) are masked in the form
of SMB network shares across the network. The fake data of
the company is replicated across the traps. Once the attacker
touches these traps, the targeted computer is disconnected from
the network and security administrator is alerted about the
incident. In effect, the attacker is held captive in the trap and
attacker actions are logged for further threat intelligence.
Polyverse: Zero-day vulnerabilities ,e.g., Heartbleed [145]
(vulnerability discovered in OpenSSL software in 2014), can
cause a significant damage in an underlying network. There
is no known attack signature to identify these vulnerabilities,
hence they can bypass security monitoring software unnoticed.
The attackers trying to target software or OS memory-based
zero-day vulnerabilities start with the assumption that the
gadgets they are trying to access are located at a certain
address or within a specific offset from the absolute base
address. Polyverse [102] employs MTD strategy to defeat
this assumption of the attackers. The polymorphic version
of Linux is utilized by Polyverse in order to create a high-
level of entropy in the software system in such a way that the
entire memory structure is diversified. With the polymorphic
versions of Linux, the entire Linux software stack is roughly
randomized. The resulting program is semantically identical to
the original program (functionally equivalent), however, nearly
every machine instruction is changed.
MorphiSec: Some threat vectors classified as Advanced
Evasive Attacks cloak the malicious intent in order to de-
ceive the security monitoring tools. Some of these techniques
include Polymorphism (changing malware signature), Meta-
morphism (changing malware code on the fly), Obfuscation
(hiding malicious activity), behavior changes (waiting for
normal user activity before executing). Morphisec [116] uses
MTD at network-level (route changes, random addresses and
ports), firewall level (policy changes), host-level (OS version,
memory structure changes), and application level (randomizing
storage format addresses, application migration, multilingual
code generation) in order to deceive and detect attacks using
evasive attack techniques.
V. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MOVING TARGET DEFENSES
In this section, we present a list of qualitative and quantita-
tive metrics that help us determine how effective a Moving Tar-
get Defense (MTD) will be or is. We first discuss the quality
of the defender actions, i.e. the various system configurations
it can choose to deploy, in terms of performance and security.
This discussion helps us identify a set of qualitative metrics
that, as we will see, most works either assume implicitly, or
are simply unaware of.
We then devote a sub-section on qualitative evaluations
metrics that are mathematical functions to help a defender
gauge the cost-benefit, the risk analysis, etc. of an MTD.
These, as we shall see, can be measured by simulation on
test-beds or by using existing security metrics such as CVSS,
attack graphs, etc.
A. Qualitative Evaluation
When using a Moving Target Defense (MTD) that moves
between multiple system configurations, we would want to
believe that it increases the security of the deployed system
without negatively impacting the performance for legitimate
users. Thus, we look at how different MTDs consider these
either when modeling or during evaluation. To evaluate the
quality of an MTD, we first look at two major aspects– security
considerations and performance considerations. Under each of
these sub-headings, we consider the quality of each individual
defense and then, the overall ensemble of constituent defenses.
This helps us identify non-trivial heuristics to understand when
an MTD might succeed or fail. For example, an MTD in
which all the constituent system configurations are vulnerable
to the same attack can never be successful even if implemented
efficiently in practice.
In regards to quality metrics, we categorize the various
MTDs in Figure 11. A work is a part of a set if they explicitly
consider the particular qualitative metric when designing either
the action set AD (i.e. what to move?), the timing (i.e. when
to move?), or the movement strategy (i.e. how to move?).
Furthermore, note that only a subset of works discussed under
security considerations (i.e. shown in the blue and/or yellow
boxes on the left of Fig. 11) are featured under performance
considerations (i.e. shown in the pink and/or green boxes on
the right of Fig. 11). We found that many MTD works only
consider (and show) the improvement in regards to security
and either assuming that it has no impact on performance or
ignore that aspect altogether. We will now discuss the details
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Qualitative Metrics
Security Considerations
Security of Individual Defenses Security of the Ensemble
Performance Considerations
Performance of Individual Defenses Performance of the Ensemble
[62], [65], [75],
[69], [127], [100],
[70], [59], [146],
[61], [65], [76],
[66], [91], [71],
[78], [79], [80],
[147]
[64], [94],
[143]
[72], [67]
[85], [7], [58],
[107], [68], [131],
[118], [77], [141]
[105], [109], [73]
Works in bold explicitly consider
diversity of configurations.
[62], [58], [59],
[146], [61], [78],
[79], [80], [94],
[148], [147]
[75], [69],
[70], [107],
[76], [71]
[7], [68], [65], [66],
[91], [131], [118],
[143]
Fig. 11: A Moving Target Defense is more effective if it considers the security and performance impacts of the system
configurations, both in unison and also when placed in an ensemble of system configurations that the MTD leverages. We try
to categorize the works which explicitly either consider these metrics while modeling or during evaluation. Note that there is
no work which considers all four kinds of metrics, i.e. falls in the intersection zone both on the left and on the right.
about how the different works capture the various qualitative
aspects that we put forth in this survey.
1) Security Considerations: We first look at works that
reason about the security risks of individual actions followed
by works that reason about the security risks associated with
an ensemble and lastly, discuss works that consider both.
a) Considers only Security of Individual Defenses: Most
MTDs the consider some form of game-theoretic modeling,
consider the security of individual defenses in the ensemble
by representing them as a part of the defender’s utility value
[62], [79], [61], [91], [67], [79], [147], [80]. For most of
these works, the security metrics considered for each action
are obtained using scoring metrics designed by experts like
the Common Vulnerability Scoring Services (CVSS) discussed
earlier. These works are able to come up with intelligent
movement strategies based on reasoning over known vul-
nerabilities (more specifically, common vulnerabilities and
exposures (CVE)) for which CVSS scores are readily available
and may result in highly sub-optimal behavior when faced
with zero-day vulnerabilities. In that regard, authors in [67]
model the security of a configuration as inversely proportional
to the probability with which an adversary can come up with
a new attack given the attacks it performed in the earlier time
steps. In [147], the authors try to model zero-day attacks
by asking security experts to annotate how effective they
think a particular countermeasure or defense action will be
against zero-day vulnerabilities. As the annotations might be
inaccurate (due to lack of actual black-hat hackers who invent
zero-day attacks in the set of security experts who annotate the
defense methods), we believe the effectiveness of their MTD
cannot be accurately determined. As to whether utility values
can capture (and if so, how) the security risks associated with
zero-day vulnerabilities is an interesting question and remains
to be explored by research works.
Other works that also only capture the security of individual
constituent system configurations are more domain or problem
specific in nature. In [75], each defense action, before being
played, is weighed based on the penalty it imposes on an
attacker (who tried to do a DDoS attack) over a repeated
game setting. In [69], authors choose an action (to migrate
a VM or keep running) after reasoning about the security
risks associated with the present vulnerable state. In [70],
the security risk is based on the reputation of the current
state, which in turn looks at the type and number of attacks
that were done in previous time steps when the particular
system was deployed. On similar lines, researchers in [65]
find a more compact way to model and continuously update
the risk associated with deploying a particular defense action.
Some other works that also consider the longitudinal effects
of movement strategy, model the epistemic effects on the
attacker’s knowledge about the network. For example, [59]
considers the fingerprint of the overall network when a par-
ticular defense action is selected, while [146] reason about
the topology information a particular defense action leaks
to an attacker. In contrast to all these works, [127] models
the security risk associated with a particular defense action
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as inversely proportional to the cost (it believes) an attacker
would spend to compromising it.
b) Considers only Security of the Ensemble: Works that
measure only the security of an ensemble as opposed to
security of actions, mostly showcase the security benefits of
the MTD ensemble by comparing them to the security benefits
provided by a static system configuration [85], [7], [58], [68],
[141]. In essence, these works consider the static system as
the control case but unfortunately, do not ensure that this static
system is the most secure constituent defense configuration in
the ensemble. This way, they might overestimate and thus,
over-promise the security guarantees of the designed MTD.
On the other hand, works that consider the security metrics
associated with the ensemble (as a whole) at modeling time
look at metrics that are similar to entropy or diversity of the
ensemble. In [131], the authors try to use the large address-
space of IPv6 to their advantage and are able to create more
uncertainty for an attacker who is trying to pinpoint the address
to use for a successful attack. On similar lines, authors in
[118] argue that fast reincarnations of a functional system
(i.e. bringing the service down and starting it up on a new
location/container, etc.) increases the entropy and makes it
more costly for an attacker to continuously keep attacking
such a system. On a different note, researchers in [105] try
to select a defense configuration from the ensemble based
on how diverse it is with respect to the current configuration
that might have been attacked. In order to do this, they use
a topological distance measure, which in their case is the
symmetric difference between the edge sets of the current
and the consecutive defense configuration. Although they do
not explicitly recognize it as a diversity metric like [109],
[73], they bring to light an interesting issue that most MTD
papers seem to either miss or assume by default. If there
was an attack, that with extremely little modification, could
exploit all the defender’s configuration that is a part of the
MTD, an MTD would not be an effective defense strategy.
For example, MTD work that randomly selects a classifier for
malware detection assumes by default that each classifier is
not vulnerable to the same attack [77] which seems to be an
incorrect assumption to make given current research works
[30], [82]. We believe that it would be easier to convince
practitioners about the effectiveness of an MTD if researchers
can show that diverse defender actions can indeed be generated
at a low cost. This is the goal of [109], who create an approach
at the compiler level to increase software diversity and [73],
who use a genetic algorithm to draw a pool of configurations
that maximize diversity.
c) Considers both: Only a few works take a holistic
view in regards to security and consider both the security of
each individual defense and the ensemble as a whole. In [64],
the general level at which they define the utility values, one
can capture the security risks associated with an individual
defense action in terms of attack surface features and attack
surface measurements while the security risks associated with
an ensemble can be captured via the utility variable for attack
surface shifting. In [143], the security for individual defense
actions is trivial for their settings, where defending a node that
is not a stepping stone is not beneficial at all for the defender.
The security risks associated with an ensemble are evaluated
through experimentation with a static defense. Particularly, the
try to increase the number of interruptions for an attacker to
start from one point in the network and reach a goal node.
In [94], the selection of the entire ensemble is based on the
fact that the set of possible defenses have a global property
of covering each of the leaves that an attacker might want to
reach and each individual defense action has some utility in
terms of security associated with it. Lastly, the works [67] and
[72] model both the diversity of constituent defenses present
in the MTD ensemble and also model the security of each
individual defense. In [72], each configuration is mapped to a
set of vulnerabilities and thus, a diverse ensemble is composed
of system configurations that do not have a lot of overlapping
vulnerabilities. In [67], since they use Linux based operating
systems, the diversity is modeled in terms of lines of code that
is different between two Operating Systems.
2) Performance Considerations: As mentioned above, a
large set of works for developing MTDs focus on showcasing
the security benefits and sweep under the rug the performance
costs. Note that in the case of MTDs, the impact on per-
formance may arise due to a variety of reasons. First, each
system configuration (individual defense action) that is a part
of the MTD ensemble has a performance cost associated
with it and moving to a high-cost configuration impacts
the performance. These concerns are termed as performance
considerations for individual defense. Second, the switching
from one configuration to another may need a defender to
deal with (1) downtime, (2) dealing with legitimate requests
on the wire that were meant for the previous configuration in a
graceful manner and/or (3) keep all the different configurations
running (at least two of them) to facilitate a faster switch. All
these costs can be termed as shuffling costs and are categorized
as performance considerations of the ensemble because they
only arise when there is an MTD ensemble.
We first describe how the different MTD systems consider
the performance costs associated with each individual config-
uration followed by the performance cost associated with the
ensemble. Lastly, we will highlight works which reason about
both these factors that will affect the overall Quality of Service
(QoS) when an MTD is deployed.
a) Considers only performance of individual defense
actions: Similar to the case of security metrics, when we look
at performance considerations for an individual defense, most
game-theoretic works model these as a part of the defender’s
utility function [62], [78], [79], [80], [95]. Various equilibrium
concepts in these games yield movement strategies for the
defender that gives priority to constituent defenses that have
low performance costs while ensuring that the security is not
impacted by a lot. In [62] and [95], the reward functions
are defined at an abstract level and the authors point out
that they can be used to consider the performance cost of
constituent defenses. In [78] and [79], the authors consider the
impact of placing Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS) on the latency of the network and use centrality based
measures as heuristic guidance for it.
For problem-specific settings, authors in [58] perform ex-
periments to Most works look at problem-specific instances.
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Quantitative Metrics
Usability Metrics
QoS Metrics [7],
[149], [67], [69],
[78], [79], [85], [105]
Cost Metrics [150],
[151], [120], [79],
[39], [152], [111]
Security Metrics
Policy Conflict
Analysis [56],
[153], [154], [155],
[156], [80]
Attack
Graph/Tree [87],
[49], [47], [56], [94],
[95], [157], [158]
Risk Metrics [159],
[50], [160], [65],
[80], [88], [87]
CIA Metrics [125],
[56], [113], [88],
[68], [73]
Fig. 12: Overview of Quantitative Metrics for MTD. The
Security and Usability metrics research works have been
categorized under sub-metrics along with research works that
consider this metric while evaluating MTD
Authors in [58] perform experiments to evaluate their MTD
against crossfire attacks and notice that the packet delay from
one point to another increase because a particular path selected
at random is highly sub-optimal. On similar lines, in [59],
the authors consider the performance cost of doing a defend
action on legitimate user traffic. On a different note, [146]
tries to solve a multi-faceted problem where the MTD tries to
obfuscate the network topology to an attacker and, at the same
time, ensures that it does not negatively impact a defender’s
ability to debug network issues. This is done by leveraging
the knowledge asymmetry about the network topology that a
defender and an attacker has. In [61], the performance costs
of a honeynet configuration, which is the defense action for
this MTD, represents the number and quality of resources (or
honey) necessary for developing a credible honeynet that fools
an attacker. Lastly, authors in [147] combine both the costs of
setting up a good defense and the usability of that defense
for legitimate traffic as the performance cost for a particular
placement of countermeasures.
b) Considers only performance of the ensemble: Mul-
tiple works try to capture the performance costs that result
because of the dynamics involved is shuffling between the
different configuration but do not look at the performance
impacts resulting because of a particular bad constituent
configuration. In [65] and [66], the authors consider the one-
step cost of switching from one defense action to another one
and seek to find a strategy that minimizes this.
Other works, instead of accounting for the performance
impact of the ensemble, compare the MTD defense to a static
system configuration by measuring usability metrics such as
latency, availability to legitimate users, etc. In [131], authors
notice an overhead of 40 bytes for the IPv6 header and latency
of 12ms during address change as opposed to 3ms when MTD
is not implemented on the network packets. They point out that
a more efficient implementation might help in one reducing
this gap to an extent. On similar lines, authors in [118] notice
that creating an entire file system replica takes two more
minutes in the case of an MTD system when compared to
a non-MTD enabled system refresh. On the contrary, [143]
does not notice negligible performance overhead for instance
replacements in a 14 node system (where one is a controller
node and the others are compute nodes). Although, they do
notice a larger number of HTTP error packets on the wire
when using the MTD. To ensure that the usability to legitimate
users is not impacted at all, authors in [68] keep multiple
systems running with the different configurations. At every
switch, they simply pick the system that serves the request.
On the downside, they incur the cost of maintaining multiple
services (at least two).
c) Considers both: A small section of works either
consider or evaluate their MTD in regards to both performance
of single constituent defenses and the ensemble. In [75], the
authors model the performance costs associated with each
defense action as a part of the utility values and consider
the shuffle cost as a part of the rewards the attacker and a
legitimate user gets in a repeated game setting. On similar
lines, in the empirical analysis of MTDs in the context of Flip-
it games [71], the authors model the cost of each defender
action as a part of defender’s utility value while the state
of the system after a move action considers the number of
servers being controlled by the defender– an indirect way of
measuring system performance. Authors in [69] consider the
availability of each defense action over a bounded time horizon
and for shuffling costs, consider the downtime or unavailability
that results when the system is migrating from one system
configuration to another. On similar lines, the authors of [70]
model the host capacity and network bandwidth associated
with each system configuration and also determine the next
configuration based on the performance of other defenses in
the previous time steps. For some works, the performance costs
associated with the ensemble do not arise due to the shuffle
but represent the cost of ensuring exact same performance
across defense configurations [107] or cost of implementing a
system that can support the various configuration [76]. More
specifically, authors in [107] create a system that ensures that
the logical virtual identifier distances between any two nodes
remain the same while in [76], the authors consider the extra
cost of creating an ensemble that is not necessary when not
using MTD.
B. Quantitative Metrics
Although we realize that the quality of MTD is key is
determining the quality of defense being offered, quantifi-
able measures about these qualitative terms are essential for
effective evaluation. For example, shuffling x % number of
hosts leads to y % reduction in attack success probability,
and z % increase in overhead/quality of service (QoS) for the
normal user. In this sub-section, we present the quantitative
analysis of MTD research works discussed in the survey.
We categorize quantitative analysis into Security Metrics and
Usability Metrics as shown in Figure 12.
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Reconnaissance
[7] [57] [113] [11] [12] [59] [150]
[60] [64] [71] [73] [85] [88] [126] [133]
[93] [94] [95] [127] [105] [107] [131]
APT and Data Exfiltration [84] [120] [37] [161] [147] [120] [78]
Vulnerability Exploitation
[91] [66] [67] [69] [72] [68] [74] [95]
[162] [111] [163] [118] [143] [164] [109]
Multi-Stage Attack [157] [80] [56] [62] [92] [163] [165] [141]
DDoS Attack [100] [58] [12] [70] [75] [126] [133] [150]
Other types of Attack [76] [88] [87] [77] [79] [120] [78] [82]
TABLE VI: Threat Model for MTD Surveyed Papers. Most
MTD research works with major threat models they target has
been highlighted in the table.
1) Security Metrics: An important aspect of network de-
fense is representation and visualization of network attacks.
Enterprise networks are becoming large and complex with
different network overlay and underlay technologies. The
adage what can’t be measured cannot be effectively managed
applies aptly here. Security metrics such as the ones shown
in the Figure 12, covers attack quantification using CVSS
metrics– Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA). This
metric also considers attack representation methods (ARMs)–
Attack Graphs and Attack Trees. We now discuss the MTD
research works from this perspective of security metrics.
We surveyed ∼ 70 MTD research articles and analyzed
them from the perspective of different threats models they
targeted. A summary of the findings has been provided in Ta-
ble VI. The key observations are as follows a) 32% of research
works focus on defense against reconnaissance attempts, b)
22% of these research works target vulnerability exploitation,
c) 11% research works use MTD defense against DoS/DDoS
attacks. There has been a limited focus on using MTD defense
for dealing with stealthy attacks like APT and data-exfiltration
(7/68 ∼ 10% research works). Also, some papers used other
types of attacks such as timing-based attacks [76], and network
intrusions [88], [87], [77], [79].
CIA Metrics: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
(CIA) are used as quantitative metrics for measurement of
impact on system under attack. Zaffarano et. al. [125] use
Confidentiality metric for measuring information exposed by
modeling tasks. The mission M confidentiality valuation v
is expressed as, Conf (M, v) = 1|T |
∑
t∈T (t, unexposed). As
the measurement equation suggests, the goal is to maintain
information as unexposed over time (t ∈ T ). Similarly In-
tegrity valuation v for mission M is quantified as Int(M, v) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T (t, intact). High integrity is ensured by keeping
information intact over time.
Conell et. al. [113] considered availability as an important
metric for analyzing impact of MTD countermeasure. The
system reconfiguration rate α is modeled as a function of sys-
tem resources using Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
modeling. The analysis of the effect of reconfiguration on
the availability is considered for fine-tuning MTD decision.
MASON [88] framework utilizes Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) alerts and vulnerability score CVSS calculated on the
basis of CIA values to identify critical services in the network.
A Page Rank based threat scoring mechanism is utilized for
combining static and dynamic information, and prioritizing
network nodes for MTD countermeasure port hopping. It is
noteworthy, that port-hopping for 40− 50% services can help
reduce overall threats in the network by 97%. This research
work, however, does not consider the usability impact induced
by the MTD countermeasure.
MORE [68] framework shows reduction in reconnaissance
attempts and exploits targeting software integrity violation on
frequent rotation of Operating Systems (OS) of the network
under attack. Experimental analysis shows that a rotation
window of 60s makes nmap fingerprinting attempts ineffective.
Temporal and spatial diversity have been used to introduce
genetic algorithm based MTD by Crouse et. al. [73]. The ex-
periments on average vulnerability of different configurations
show decaying vulnerability rates for evolved configurations
selected from the chromosome pool of VM configurations.
Attack Graph/ Attack Tree: CVSS present only a piece
of quantitative information about the vulnerabilities such as
complexity of performing network attack, impact on confi-
dentiality or integrity of the system if the attack is successful,
etc. This information alone is not sufficient for taking MTD
decisions. Attack representation methods (ARMs) such as
Attack Graph [49] and Attack Tree [47] answer questions such
as (a) What are the possible attack paths in the system (b) What
attack paths can be taken by the attacker to reach a specific
target node in the network.
SDN based scalable MTD solution [56] makes use of attack
graph-based approach to perform the security assessment of a
large scale network. Based on the security state of the cloud
network, MTD countermeasures are selected.
The Figure 13 shows system modules and operating layers,
which are the part of SDN based MTD framework. The overlay
network is responsible for vulnerability analysis, attack graph
generation. The physical network consists of Open vSwitch
(OVS), running on top of the physical server. The SDN
controller interacts with OVS using OpenFlow APIs.
Bayesian attack graphs have been used by Miehling et.
al. [94] for defending the network against vulnerability ex-
ploitation attempts. The defender’s problem is formulated as
a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
and optimal defense policy for selecting countermeasures is
identified as a solution for the POMDP.
The security analysis of a large-scale cloud network in
real time is a challenging problem. Attack Graphs help in
identification of possible attack scenarios that can lead to
exploitation of vulnerabilities in the cloud network. The attack
graphs, however, suffer from scalability issues, beyond a few
hundred nodes as we discussed in Section II.
Risk Metrics: Like any other system, MTD systems have
an associated risk once an organization considers deploying
whole or part of the MTD technique. According to the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), there
are several attacks, service disruptions, and errors caused by
human or machines that may lead to breaking benefits and
critical assets at the organization or national level. Risks
assessment is a critical measure and has many ways to deploy
and use. In this survey, we identify and highlight research work
that has adopted and took into consideration risks associated
with deploying MTD solution. Specifically, we emphasize on
the research work that evaluates the cost of the adopted MTD
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Fig. 13: System modules and operating layers of an MTD-based solution using SDN. The system comprises of quantitative
metric based on vulnerabilities, attack graph at overlay network and policy conflict detection at the logical network layer.
solution, since system administrators need to take into account
the cost of using the MTD solution.
Risk assessment in the MTD has a direct and strong
relationship with the effectiveness of the deployed MTD
technique. According to [159], the system administrator can
determine how good the MTD solution is by examining the
associated risk. Therefore, the authors [159] studied the effect
of deploying each MTD technique alone (i.e. shuffle, diversity,
and redundancy) by inspecting the Hierarchical Attack Rep-
resentation Method (HARM). HARM is basically a ARM at
the upper layer such as attack graph (AG), and another ARM
in the lower layer such as attack tree (AT), where these to
ARM have a one-to-one mapping between them. Moreover,
the authors also studied the associated risk by computing the
instance measure (IM) which uses vulnerability’s base score,
impact score, etc [50].
Feedback-driven multi-stage MTD has been proposed by
Zhu et. al. [65] for dealing with multi-stage attacks like
Stuxnet [166]. Author’s quantify the damage or cost caused
by an attacker at different stages of the network. The game
between attacker-defender is modeled as a finite zero-sum ma-
trix game with a bounded cost function, and a mixed-strategy
Saddle Point Equilibrium (SPE). Players utilize cost-function
learned online to update MTD strategies. The numerical results
show that feedback mechanism allows network defense to
respond to unexpected (exogenous) events and reduce unusual
peak of risk imposed by different vulnerabilities.
In [120], the authors provided metrics for MTD evaluation
and risk analysis. For risk metrics, they proposed statistical
metrics to study the effect of how the attacker can quickly
conduct and succeed in adversarial attacks. The authors as-
sumed the system will always have a running task that can
be measured. The validity of the metrics was studied by
simulating the APT attack scenario, where they assumed
the APT will always have some sort of overhead that can
be measured and detected. Finally, the performance of the
proposed metrics was measured also by examining the CPU
utilization of the designed system.
Cheng et al. [62] considered the game theoretical part of
MTD systems Specifically, the Markov Game. The authors
provided a theorem, subject to probabilistic constraints, to
calculate the revenue for the defensive and offensive ap-
proaches in MTD systems. Their work depended on testing
different defensive and offensive strategies and was tested
using a networking setup that includes vulnerable services and
a firewall component as well.
Another work considered the statistical approach to evaluate
the likelihood of a successful attack is the work conducted
by [78]. The authors proposed an approach to determine the
minimum effort required a system to detect stealthy botnets.
Moreover, the entropy was measured to determine how close
an adversary is to the detection point, where high entropy
indicates the attacker is far in distance from the detector. The
evaluation of the proposed approach was conducted on a real
ISP network obtained from [167]. The results of the proposed
algorithm show that the detection strategy has a complexity of
O(N3) although theoretical complexity analysis indicates the
algorithm is ∼ O(N6).
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Chung et al. [87] provided a detailed and comprehensive
evaluation for the optimal countermeasure selection over a set
of vulnerable attack paths in the attack graph. By evaluating
the CVSS score of vulnerabilities, the authors determined the
countermeasure selection option, taking into account the ration
of the Return of Investment (ROI). Countermeasure option that
produces the smallest ROI is considered the optimal one. The
system performance of NICE [87] is proven to be efficient in
terms of network delay, CPU utilization, and the traffic load.
To study the effect of a number of intrusions on the system’s
threat, Chowdhary et al. [56] used a statistical approach also
to evaluate how the number of intrusion in the system, with
the number of vulnerabilities, affect the threat score. The
threat scoring algorithm is similar to Page Rank algorithm. To
evaluate the proposed work, two experiments were conducted.
One experiment is to test the threat scoring engine on software
vulnerabilities and IDS alerts. The second experiments study
the effect of port hopping attack. The results show that as
the number of services in the system increase, the service
risk value remains unchanged between a specified interval.
However, the first few services show an increase in the number
of risk value. Finally, the port hopping attack showed a
reduction in threat score.
Policy Conflict Analysis: The MTD countermeasures such
as network address switching can dynamically and rapidly
insert new type of traffic, or new flow rules (environment
managed by SDN). Pisharody et. al. [153], [154] show how
different MTD countermeasures such as network address
change, load-balancing, and intrusion detection can cause
security policy violations. The research works discuss SDN-
based MTD, but the policy conflicts can cause security viola-
tions [155], loops, and blackholes in the network as discussed
by Khursid et. al. [156]. The violations of network-wide in-
variants and security policies must be analyzed before deploy-
ment of MTD countermeasure. This research challenge is an
important quantitative metric, which has not been considered
by a lot of research works. We discuss this as a possible
research oppurtunity in Section VI.
2) Usability Metrics: This category as shown in the Fig-
ure 12, analyzes MTD research work from the aspects such as
QoS (network bandwidth, delay), impact on existing mission
metrics and the cost of deploying MTD defense.
QoS Metrics: MTD can induce some performance cost on
the existing system resources. Jafarian et. al. [7] identify the
virtual IP (vIP) mutation, range allocation, and range distribu-
tion constraints in order to minimize the QoS impact which
can be induced by vIP collisions, as well as, maintain optimal-
level of unpredictability. Probabilistic performance analysis of
MTD reconnaissance defenses has been conducted by Crouse
et. al. [149]. The research work analyzes quantifiable MTD
metrics such as reconnaissance, deception performance, attack
success probability vs connection drop probability, attacker’s
success probability under different conditions such as network-
size, number of vulnerable computers.
Taylor et. al. [120] used mission and attack metrics for
analyzing the effectiveness of a network defense. The research
work analyzes dynamic defenses such as Active Re-positioning
in Cyberspace for Synchronized Evasion (ARCSYNE) and
Self-shielding Dynamic Network Architecture (SDNA) using
mission and adversary activity set. Mission Success, i.e.,
the rate at which mission tasks are completed, and Mission
Productivity, i.e., how often are mission tasks successful are
used as QoS measurement metrics are used for evaluations.
A statistical analysis of static vs. dynamic attacks against
different MTD strategies– uniform, random, diversity-based,
evolution-based, and optimal– has been conducted by Carter
et. al. [67]. Experimental results on performance vs. adapt-
ability shows that diversity-based MTD is the optimal strategy
against most attack scenarios. They also show that uncertainty
about the adversary type– slow adversary or fast-evolving
adversary– can adversely impact the effectiveness of an MTD.
El-Mir [69] model performance parameters such as avail-
ability, downtime, and downtime cost using a Continuous Time
Markov Chain (CTMC) model. The experimental results show
that cost-effective VM migration can be performed in an SDN-
based network with limited impact on network performance.
The research work utilizes normalized CVSS score as a basis
for VM migration.
Sengupta et. al. [79] analyze the performance impact of
placing IDS (NIDS and HIDS) at all possible enforcement
points in a cloud network. It is noteworthy that placement of
more than 15 detection agents in their simulated network fails
to provide any additional intrusion detection benefit, whereas
the network throughput decreases drastically 16 Gbps in the
case of a single detection agent to ∼ 6 Gbps when 15 detection
agents are placed.
CHAOS [85] analyzes how the delay intentionally intro-
duced by MTD impacts the packet count in a SDN-managed
network. The SDN controller utilizes host-mutation and decoy-
severs to deceive an adversary. The obfuscated network in-
creases the cost and difficulty for an adversary targeting the
network. The percentage of information disclosure reduces
from 90% to 10% in a CHAOS protected network, with slight
impact on packet delay (1s to 1.5s for 1800 packets).
Cost Metrics: Protection against Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks is one of the important priorities for
many cyber systems. Wang et al. [150] presented a cost-
effective MTD solution against DDoS and Covert Channel
attacks. Through MTD adaptation, their work [150] aims
to answer two main questions: 1) what is the adaptation
cost?, and 2) what is the cost incurred by a defender if an
attacker succeeds in exploiting a particular vulnerability?. This
solution does not rely on IDS-generated alerts while making
the adaptation. The adaptation cost includes any cost related
to purchasing required software or hardware that helps in
the adaptation process. Lei et. al. [151] utilize change-point
analysis method for evaluation MTD cost-benefit for a multi-
layer network resource graph. The proposed method analyzes
mission productivity (∆M ), and attack success productivity
(∆A) on dynamic network address translation (DNAT). The
evaluation results show reduced attack success probability
using DNAT over a network under observation. The path
enumeration mechanism used in this research work can, how-
ever, suffers from scalability challenges because of frequent
path probability calculation and update operations. The cost
and effectiveness evaluation of reactive and proactive net-
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work defense strategies, has been conducted by Taylor et.
al. [120] using Measurement of Effectiveness (MOE) metrics.
The research work considers hop-delay for different attack
success rates, and static defense policies. They show that an
attacker’s productivity, i.e., how quickly attacker can perform
adversarial tasks increases against static defense, whereas
attacker’s confidentiality, i.e., ability to remain undetected is
same for both the static and the dynamic defense case.
VI. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we highlight some aspects that have received
limited attention in the development of Moving Target De-
fenses (MTDs) and thus, are potentially interesting research
directions to pursue. In Figure 14, we provide a list of future
directions that trivially emerge due to the categorization we
provide in this survey and now, discuss some of them in detail.
A. What to move
The movement of the prevention surface, which comprises
of security modules such as Firewall and Intrusion Prevention
Systems (IPS), has only been investigated by a couple of works
(see discussion in Section III-A4). MTD research can consider
exploring Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) architectures,
which combines security modules such as firewall, content
filter, anti-virus, in order to provide a multi-layered defense-
in-depth solution. Some current implementations of NGFW,
that can be leveraged for testing the effectiveness of these
defenses, are Cisco ASA [168] and PAN Firewall [169].
As previously stated, the movement of different surfaces
in a single framework, although challenging, can provide
greater security benefits than the movement of a single surface.
Investigation in this area would require one to identify sets of
configurations across the various surfaces that are compatible
(in terms of performance) with one another. This prevents
the number of strategies from multiplying uncontrollably by
leveraging the expertise of system designers.
The categorization of the various software surfaces should
make one wonder about the possibility of creating logical
surface level divisions. At that point, MTDs for shifting these
surfaces introduce a new set of challenges for researchers to
work on. For example, Microsegmentation [170] is a method of
creating secure zones in data centers and cloud deployments to
isolate workloads from one another and secure them individu-
ally. With MTD formalism, one can test the existing hypothesis
and develop new ones for microsegmentation. We believe that
formal modeling, in line with [80], one might discover that
advanced services will be more effective when applied at a
granular-level (as close to the application as possible in a
distributed manner).
B. When to Move
We believe that the MTD timing problem in general, and
strategic VPS methods deserve more attention than what it has
got from the MTD community. The idea of keeping secure
configurations deployed for a long time while ensuring that
less secure configurations are not shifted too fast to impact
performance or availability of a system seems intriguing.
Thus, in a situation-aware framework that can identify
anomalous traffic, the strategy for when to take a defense
action can be improved keeping in mind of both performance
and security. This becomes significant in the setting of com-
mercial networks where performance, the main currency for
business, is key. A good timing strategy should try to ensure
consistency of performance-related aspects such as network
topology, current threat level, system configuration, current
requests-on-the-wire, etc. while increasing the attacker’s cost.
The issue of scalability also arises when trying to in-
corporate the time into the modeling. Existing approaches
like [62] land up increasing the size of the state space in
order to incorporate time as a parameter. For even small to
medium-sized enterprise networks, this explosion of states
poses problems for the algorithms that infer the defender’s
strategy. An investigating into this problem and the invention
of effective solutions is an interesting direction for the future.
C. How to Move
In APTs, attackers are known to demonstrate sequential
attack behavior spread over a long time. Defense-in-depth
defense mechanisms like MTD, which are known to be useful
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against APTs, have received less attention. Rass et al. [161],
[147] talks about the use use of attack graphs as a basis
for modeling APT scenarios as a two-player zero-sum game.
They model each step in the graph, defined at a distant
bound from the goal node as a game and try to come up
with defense and attack strategies at each node. Their work,
similar to other works that use Markov Games such as [62],
[80], assume that the attacker’s location is known at any
given point of time and the game between the defender and
attackers helps the former identify or thwart an attack action.
On the other hand, modeling this as a decision problem for the
defender with partial observability results in a POMDP where
calculating strategies, for even small-sized cloud networks,
becomes unrealistic [94]. As an academic exercise, researchers
have even gone one step further and modeled the interaction
as a Partial Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) [95] giving
up on any hope of being useful in realistic settings.
Thus, it is safe to say that current research works on APT
have either made strong assumptions about the attacker or
modeled the APT scenarios as too difficult a problem to
be scalable, making evaluation of such defense based on
qualitative aspects (such as QoS, latency for the normal users)
impossible. Suggestions by Huang et al. [171] about the use
of MTD-based countermeasures against APTs seems a distant
goal. At the very least, finding good ways to approximate
solutions for Markov games or stochastic shortest path games
seem to fit the bill for effectively coming up with optimal
MTD policies against APTs.
D. Qualitative Evaluation
As seen in Figure 11, none of the existing works discuss
all four types of metrics we put forward in this survey. It is
easy to notice that even leaving out one of them may result in
performance or security impact in an actual deployed scenario.
Moreover, coming up with an MTD that incorporate all these
metrics when coming up with effective movement strategies
should not be difficult because one can survey existing works
to realize what metrics to incorporate.
E. Quantitative Evaluation
The management of firewall policies, as discussed above, is
a challenging task. Firewall filtering rules have to be carefully
written and analyzed in order to implement the security
policies correctly. MTDs that involve operations such as VM
migration, route randomization, IP address shuffling etc. that
involve movement may make it complicated to define and
maintain security policies for the underlying network. This
can result in both the dropping of legitimate traffic and lead
to the introduction of new attack points. We first discuss a
concrete example to motivate the practicality of this issue and
then, talk about works that have been pursued, but are far from
providing effective solutions to the problem.
In the data center network shown in Figure 15, we have
Tenant A hosting a web farm. Being security conscious, only
traffic on TCP port 443 is allowed into the IP addresses that
belong to the web servers. When an attack directed against
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Fig. 15: Motivating scenario for addressing policy conflicts in
a SDN-managed cloud environment that may arise due to the
movement of Moving Target Defenses.
host A2 has been detected, the MTD application responds with
countermeasures and takes two actions:
• a new webserver (host A3) is spawned to handle the load
of host A2; and
• the IP for host A2 is migrated to the Honeypot network
and assigned to host Z.
In order to run forensics and isolate an attacker, the Hon-
eyPot network permits all in-bound traffic, but allows no out-
bound traffic to other sections of the data center. These actions
result in new flow rules being injected into the flow table that
• permits all traffic inbound to the IP that originally be-
longed to host A2, but now belongs to host Z.
• modifies an incoming packets destination address from
host A2 to host A3 if the source is considered to be a
non-adversarial source.
• stops all outbound traffic from the IP that originally
belonged to host A2 but now belongs to host Z to the
rest of the data center.
• permits traffic on port 443 to host A3 (not of great
importance to our case). The original policy allowing only
port 443 to the IP of host A2, and the new policy allowing
all traffic to the IP address of host Z are now in conflict.
Chowdhary et al. [56] has tried to address this issue of
security policy conflict for an SDN-managed cloud network.
However, it is not clear how their work can be applied in the
context of all the MTDs discussed in this survey. A key idea is
to have a continuous feedback cycle that verifies the security
policy in place post MTD-countermeasure deployment. This
can be done by ensuring end-to-end integration and regression
test for the various use-cases pertaining to network traffic.
Another solution could be to incorporate the policy conflicts
that might arise into the modeling of the MTD. This would
produce safe movement policies that avoid conflicts.
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F. Proposing novel Moving Target Defenses
An important goal of this survey, as discussed in the
introduction, was to provide a terminology for describing new
MTDs. As an example, consider the work [80]. This MTD can
be defined as a multi-stage game modeling of the movement of
detection surfaces with fixed interval switching that performs
simulation studies of simple use-cases and considers the
security and performance of only individual defenses.
An interesting idea would be to turn this goal of ours
on its head and explore the design of new MTDs based
on the permutations of the various categorization aspects
designed in this survey. For example, a hybrid surface shifting
MTD that (1) shifts the detection surface and then based on
a stochastic environment, shifts the prevention surface, (2)
models this problem as a two-step game, (3) considers rewards
that incorporate performance of individual actions and security
of the ensemble, and (4) showcases experimental results on an
emulated testbed is a possibly a novel Moving Target Defense!
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we look at various Moving Target Defenses
(MTDs) that have been proposed for enhancing network
security. First, we categorize them based at what surfaces these
works move, when the move operation occurs, and how they
move between the different constituent system configurations.
In doing so, we highlight how the movement of particular
software surfaces is linked to Advanced Persistent Threats;
thereby, allowing us to understand how the various MTDs can
help against such attacks. The dearth of works that consider
the simultaneous movement of different surfaces points to an
exciting research direction and possibly, the invention of more
effective MTDs. In answering how to move, we notice that
many approaches leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods
in general and game-theoretic techniques in particular for
crafting intelligent movement strategies.
Second, we discuss how these MTDs can be implemented in
practice. We find that the use of centralized technologies like
Software Defined Networking (SDN) helps in implementing
the MTD countermeasures with limited impact on network
performance. We showcase how the surveyed MTDs are
implemented in the context of real-world systems ranging
from simulation studies to use in commercial products. We
highlight the key technologies leveraged by the various MTDs,
the layers of the network protocol stack at which an MTD is
effective and the level of maturity at which it is implemented.
We also breifly describe a few test-beds that have either been
leveraged by existing MTDs (or are similar) and encourage
researchers to use them for evaluating the effectiveness of
proposed MTDs. We conclude that SDN/NFV is a dominant
technology used by MTDs and cyber-deception methods and
that the industry adoption of MTD solutions is still limited to
few application-security products.
Third, we discuss the various (qualitative and quantitative)
metrics used for measuring the effectiveness of these MTDs
under a single categorization that talks about both security
and performance of the system. Then, we categorize the
different works depending on whether an MTD either models
a particular metric or evaluates its defense based on that
metric. With this holistic view, we note that none of the MTDs
consider all the different metrics we put forth. One wonders
a defense that models all these metrics will be realizable in
practice and prove to be better both in regards to performance
and security.
Lastly, we highlight the areas of network security where the
scope of developing MTDs have not been explored much and
can prove to be quite effective in terms of improving security.
We conclude by showcasing how our categorization provides
a common terminology for researchers to describe and even
develop future MTDs.
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